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INTRODUCTION
At the heart of Derrick Bell's work lies a conundrum. He argues
that racism is permanent, and yet at the same time he insists that the
struggle against racism remains worthwhile and valuable. A number of
critics find Bell's thesis about racism's permanence to be so despairing
that, on its own terms, it renders any meaningful possibility of action
t DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUS-
TICE 125 (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED]. The phrase comes from a
passage in one of Bell's fictional chronicles and refers to a contention levied by the main
protagonist in that chronicle, Ben Goldrich. While this Article concentrates on Protestant
theology, the boundaries of this theological inquiry are expanded when we realize that
Bell describes Goldrich as Jewish.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. My thanks
to Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Jean Stefancic for their helpful comments on a
prior draft.
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against racism totally unavailing.' My goal, by contrast, is to try to make
sense of the paradox that lies so deep at the core of Bell's work and assess
how the possibilities of action can coexist with racism's perdurance. While
a number of scholars in this post-civil rights era have turned to the social
sciences to address why racism remains so persistent,2 I want to draw
upon possible insights from theology. Theological analysis may provide a
separate source of insight into not only racism's persistence but what Bell
calls its "permanence." And theology may illuminate how it is possible to
acknowledge racism's permanence and still engage in action against it.
My reference to theology takes the form of an analogy drawn from
Christian theology, in particular from the work of the twentieth century
American Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr3 At the core of Nie-
buhr's depiction of Christianity too lies a paradox: sin is an inextricable
structure of human life, and yet human action remains meaningful. As in
Bell, the paradox is not overcome; the paradox of the juxtaposition of sin
1. See, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, A Critique of Professor Derrick A. Bell's Thesis of the Perma-
nence of Racism and His Strategy of Confrontation, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 23, 24 (1995)
("Professor Bell's work propagates a damaging and dampening message .... ); john a.
powell, Racial Realism or Racial Despair?, 24 CONN. L. R-Ev. 533, 550 (1992) (arguing that
Bell's thesis is "unsuccessfil in avoiding despair").
2. See, e.g.,Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CA. L. REV. 733 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rav. 317 (1987); Lu-in
Wang, The Transforming Power of "Hate": Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related
Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (1997).
3. I will rely on Niebuhr's principal theological work, The Nature and Destiny of
Man, as well as an earlier major work, Moral Man and Immoral Society. See REINHOLD NIE-
BUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY (1932) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND
IMMORAL SOCIETY]; 1-2 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN (Charles
Scribner's Sons 1964) (1943) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN]. My
analysis has benefitted from a most important new commentary on Niebuhr by theologian
Langdon Gilkey. See LANGDON GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR: A THEOLOGICAL STUDY (2001) [here-
inafter GILKEv, ON NIEBUHR]. One of the pleasures of my graduate education was the
opportunity to attend Gilkey's class lectures on Niebuhr.
As my research was ending, I came across the only other article of which I am
aware that probes a similar interest in the relationship between Niebuhr and the persis-
tence of racism thesis. See Davison M. Douglas, Reinhold Niebuhr and Critical Race Theory, in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 149 (Michael W McConnell et al. eds.,
2001). While the present Article, as the text goes on to discuss, considers the affinities be-
tween the paradoxes of sin and action and of racism and action, Douglas's attention lies in
an element of that relationship: the support Niebuhr provides to an understanding of why
racism persists. See, e.g., id. at 151. Douglas concentrates more on Niebuhr's social theory; I
will elaborate more the details of Niebuhr's theology. Douglas also discusses critical race
theory in general, while my comments focus specifically on the work of Bell. These differ-
ences in our attention do nothing, of course, to undermine my appreciation for Douglas's
insight into the relevance of Niebuhr for understanding critical race theory. His thesis
helped confirm that I too might be on the right track.
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and action is one that has challenged Christianity since its origins. My
claim is that the dynamics of the relation between sin and action may il-
luninate the dynamics of the relation between racism and action.
It is not necessary to my argument that racism be shown to be on-
tologically sinful, sinful as an actual, ultimate fact. The argument therefore
requires no belief in the veracity of the Christian doctrine of sin, al-
though many may believe racism is indeed sinful as that term is
understood doctrinally. My thesis is a more modest one: there is a reso-
nance between the depiction of sin and the depiction of racism, a
resonance at the level of lived experience. Whatever the ultimate reality of
sin, its characterization of the experience of human life usefully illumi-
nates the experience of racism; it helps capture the reality of that
experience.' Further, the lived experience of what it means to under-
stand sin and yet be able to act may usefully inform what it means to
experience racism and yet also act. To argue for a resonance between sin
and racism rather than some identity may as well be more true to Bell's
work. As I will explore, Bell's religious background and religious faith
permeate his work and provide him with a deep source of his resil-
ience.5 This faith, which commentaries on Bell have not sufficiently
assessed, seems a key element of Bell's belief in the availability and merit
of action despite racism's permanence. So the resonance seems very
strong between Bell's call to action in the face of racism and the theo-
logical call to action in spite of sin. And yet despite the prevalence of
religious vocabulary in Bell's writings, the topic of sin itself little ap-
pears, a point I shall also probe.6 The theology of sin discussed here is
therefore not necessarily Bell's own. Hence the argument is one of the
resonance between racism and sin rather than their identity, and my sub-
ject is theology and Derrick Bell rather than Derrick Bell's theology.
Part I develops Bell's thesis that racism is permanent, an ineradica-
ble structure in American life.7 Bell's stance here is unrelenting and a
direct and deep challenge to liberal notions of racial progress. This sec-
tion draws out the social facts Bell provides about the status of Blacks in
American society' and examines Bell's argument for the continuing
4. To be more formal, the analysis is then phenomenological-the experience as
lived-rather than ontological-the experience in its more ultimate reality.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 289-308.
6. Of special interest, of course, are those points where Bell uses the term "sin," as
in the passage referred to in this article's tide. See infra note 310.
7. Like Bell, I restrict analysis to racism in American life rather than speculate on
the condition of racism more globally.
8. Following Bell, I retain his primary emphasis on the divide between Blacks and
Whites, rather than on the divides(s) between Whites and other people of color. Bell is
certainly aware of the multiplicity of racial divides in this country. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL,
FACES AT THE BoTToM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RAcIsM 191 (1992) [hereinafter
BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM] (discussing the internment of Japanese Americans during
World War II). He is also very much aware of the multiplicity of oppressions that
SPRING 2004]
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disparity between the races, particularly the claim that Whites hold on to
a property in Whiteness. Part II analyzes Bell's call for action despite ra-
cism's permanence. Part III develops Niebuhr's theology of the possibility
of action despite sin. Niebuhr too criticizes the liberal-and liberal theo-
logical-belief in continuing progress; for Niebuhr, evil is not overcome.
Part IV returns to Bell and assesses his religious orientation and the de-
gree it may be receptive to Niebuhr's theology. Part of the assessment here
will be whether Bell's stance is more existential rather than religious. Part
V concludes by examining some of the larger implications of Bell's thesis:
the continuation of deep structures that resist characterization simply as
social constructions. Reference will be briefly drawn to the contributions
of Bell and critical race theory to a movement beyond nonfoundational-
ism.9 Because the Article intends to offer additional grounds for the
comprehension of Bell's conundrum-that racism is permanent and yet
must be continually fought-the goal is understanding, not criticism. I
hence assume Bell's thesis throughout.
I.THE PROBLEM: RACISM'S PERMANENCE
A. Bell' Thesis
Bell's thesis is direct and searing: "[R]acism is an integral, permanent, and
indestructible component of this society."0 This thesis of "the permanence of
racism" is asserted as the subtitle of his book, Faces at the Bottom of the Well"
individuals may undergo-"sexism, classism, homophobia, and other forms of oppres-
sions"-and that, as "a good deal of the writing in critical race theory stresses ... oppressions
are neither neatly divorceable from one another nor amenable to strict categorization." Id. at
144-45; see infra text accompanying notes 331-37 (developing Bell's discussion of the divide
between Black men and Black women). Nevertheless, Bell's predominant emphasis is on the
divide between Blacks and Whites, and this Article replicates that emphasis.
As the Article will only begin to suggest, while a primary interest lies in developing
the distinctive vantage point and insights that Bell offers, I am interested as well in what
might be the distinctive vantage points, insights, and, indeed, theologies that might be
offered by those of other racial backgrounds. See infra note 308. Richard Delgado, for in-
stance, argues that one of the limitations of Bell's analysis is, precisely, its "binary" emphasis
on the divide between Blacks and Whites, an emphasis that limits attention to the possi-
bilities of more polycentric, collaborative action between peoples of various colors. See
Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit to Dismantle That Famous House?, 75 N.YU. L.
REv. 283, 306-07 (2000).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 385-96.
10. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xiii.
11. See supra note 8.
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and is reiterated in the title of several of his articles. 2 In Faces at the Bottom
of the Well,13 Bell's position is emphatic and unremitting:
-"[R]acism in America is not a curable aberration ... ." (x)
-"[T]he sources of racial problems ... grow more intracta-
ble with time." (xii)
-Black people will never gain full equality in this country."
(12)
-"[R]acism is a permanent component of American life."
(13)
-"[R]acism is a permanent part of the American land-
scape." (92)
-"[O]ppression on the basis of race returns time after
time-in different guises, but it always returns." (97)
-"[R]acism is permanent, the ultimate betrayal ... " (108)
-"[R]acism lies at the center, not the periphery; in the
permanent, not in the fleeting ... ." (198)
The message permeates Bell's corpus. While Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion'4 mandated the end of state-sponsored segregation, no other decision
is society "increasingly willing to commemorate, and less and less willing
to follow."'5 The song "We Shall Overcome" remains a civil rights anthem,
but "the contrary teachings of racial history, combined with the ever-
more troubling realities of the present, now intrude ever more rudely and
insistently on the dream."'6 The repeated force of Bell's thesis pummels
and washes over the reader with the intensity of an insistent stream.
12. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Racism is Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 How. L.J. 79 (1991)
[hereinafter Bell, Racism is Here to Stay]; Derrick Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis: Cou-
rageous Revelation or Unconscious Denial of Racial Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 571 (1993)
[hereinafter Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis]. Also hard-hitting is the title of Bell's book
prior to Faces at the Bottom, see supra note 8, which is called And We Are Not Saved. See
supra note t. The tide refers to a lament from Jeremiah: "The Harvest is past, the summer
is ended, and we are not saved." Id. at 241. Yet while this lament highlights that racial jus-
tice has not occurred, a point distressing enough in itself, the tenor at this time in Ben's
writing is not necessarily that racial justice will never occur,
13. In the succeeding quotations, citations to Bell's Faces at the Bottom, supra note 8,
are provided in the text.
14. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. DERRCK BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES 49 (1998) [hereinafter BELL, AFROIANTICA
LEGACIES]; see also id. at 133 ("Because the mesh of racism is so woven into the nation's
essential fabric, I am convinced we can never eradicate it."); id. at 134 ("[E]ven those gains
we consider rock-solid can be taken away in a moment.").
16. Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis, supra note 12, at 572; see also id. at 573
("[R]acism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible component of this society.").
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The severity of Bell's indictment is perhaps most keenly reflected in
his fictional chronicle, The Space Traders,17 Bell's best-known 18 fable. There
Bell offers the story of alien visitors to the United States who promise the
country wealth, environmental decontaminants, and alternatives to fossil
fuel. 9 The gifts will assure the country's prosperity for the foreseeable fu-
ture. 0 There is only one catch. In return for the gifts, the space traders
want to take home all of this country's Blacks.2' After significant debate,
the nation votes conclusively for the trade.22 The country does not decide
on the basis of what is moral or right but on the basis of protection of
White self-interest. 23 Racism is so powerful and abiding a motivation that
it overcomes resistance to a vote approving a deep injustice. 24 Bell reports
that in his lecture audiences significant majorities agree that were such a
vote actually to be taken, the result would agree with that in the fable.
2
1
And a number of Blacks have related to Bell that were the choice made
available to them, they would choose to go. "Knowing what they know,
they say, 'Better risk the unknown in space than face the certainty of racial
discrimination here at home "-26 The trade presented in the fable is unset-
tling precisely because it is not so fantastical as it might first appear.
27
17. See BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM, supra note 8, at 158-94.
18. See Derrick Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893,
902 [hereinafter Bell, Whos Afraid of Critical Race Theory?] (so stating).
19. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 159-60.
20. Id. at 164.
21. Id. at 160.
22. Id. at 192.
23. Id. at 171,174.
24. Id. at 185,189.
25. Derrick Bell, After We're Gone: Prudent Speculations on America in a Post-Racial
Epoch, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 393, 405 (1990). Admittedly, Bell's audiences are self-selective,
but it is not clear how that cuts. Are they predisposed to be sympathetic to Bell's argu-
ments, or are they predisposed in favor of a belief in racial progress? The racial
composition of his audience may play a factor in this determination, but even here the
correspondence is not uniform.
26. DERRICK BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR AN ALIEN LAND
CALLED HOME 32 (1996) [hereinafter BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS]. The statement occurs in the
context of another of Bell's fables, but the inference is that the statement is factual. In the
original Space Traders fable, Bell has a character argue during the convocation of "The
Anti-Trade Coalition": "Outside civil rights gatherings like this, the masses of [Bilack
people-those you claim to represent but to whom you seldom listen-are mostly re-
signed to the nation's acceptance of the Space Traders' offer. For them, liberal optimism is
smothered by their life experience." BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM, supra note 8, at 174.
27. See Derrick Bell, Black History and America's Future, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 1179,
1191 (1995) [hereinafter Bell, Black History and America's Future]. Other commentators
argue that the space trade is not at all fantastic but instead replicative of actual events in
American history. See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and
Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. Louis U. LJ. 425, 429
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B. The Evidence
Bell's thesis is undeniably forceful, but what evidence does Bell pro-
vide in support? Does Bell simply dismiss the changes in the laws and
behaviors affecting Blacks? It is most significant for comprehension of the
deep substance of his thesis that he does not. He acknowledges "[t]angible
progress,"2 particularly the removal of formal barriers that maintained
segregation. We no longer see signs allocating public facilities by race.29
Millions of Blacks are registered to vote and do vote. Nationally, several
thousand Blacks have been elected to public office. 3° These are changes
that "seemed at one time impossible to achieve."3
And yet ... how deep-seated are these changes? To what degree are
they fundamental rather than at the surface?32 Has the structure of racism
altered? Bell recognizes progress, and yet, he insists, "nothing has
changed"
3
What does Bell mean? His response occurs at two levels. First, de-
spite the entrance of certain Blacks to the middle and professional
classes, 34 the actual economic plight of Blacks as a class is no better than it
was and may be worse. Second, the structure of racism persists. As to the
first, the figures are dire: Black unemployment has been twice that of
Whites; Black income has been a little over half that of Whites; joblessness
(1990) ("Not only have Blacks been enslaved, as the Chronicles sorrowfully notes, but other
racial groups have been conquered and removed, imported for their labor and not allowed
to participate in the society they built, or expelled when their labor was no longer consid-
ered necessary.") Olivas cites the Cherokee removal from Georgia, the importation of
Chinese workers and then the Chinese Exclusion laws, and the importation of Mexican
laborers under the Bracero Program. Id. at 430-39. See also Richard Delgado & Jean Ste-
fancic, Derrick Bell's Chronicle of the Space Traders: Would the US. Sacrifice People of Color if the
Price Were Right?, 62 U. CoLo. L. REv. 321, 323-24 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefan-
cic, Derrick Bell's Chronicle]; Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform:
Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE LJ. 923, 941 (1988) [hereinafter Delgado, Derrick Bell and
the Ideology of Racial Reform] (discussing the removal of Japanese Americans during World
War II). In the context of his fable, Bell also discusses the removal of Japanese Americans
during this war. See BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM, supra note 8, at 191.
28. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note ', at 5; see also BELL, AFROLANTICA
LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 165 ("Even the most determined pessimist must acknowledge
the change in the racial landscape in the last century."); BELL, AND WE ARE Nor SAVED,
supra note t, at 73 ("Much has changed.").
29. BELL, AND WE ARE NO SAVED, supra note t[, at 45, 170; BELL, FACES AT THE
BoTToM, supra note 8, at 5-6.
30. BELL, AND WE ARE NO SAVED, supra note ', at 92.
31. Id. at 232.
32. See, e.g., id. at 93 (discussing that changes such as increases in Black voting "are
more cosmetic than real").
33. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 22.
34. Bell will argue that these individual advances in fact have relieved societal pres-
sure for the advance of Blacks as a class. See infra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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has ravaged not only individuals, but also their families and their larger
communities;35 one-third of young Black men are either in prison or in
the hands of the criminal justice system;36 more Black men are in prison
than in college.37 Brown's3 promise of integrated education remains unful-
filled.39 Schools are now more segregated than they were three decades
ago.40 The courts are increasingly resistant to claims for racial redress. 41 In
Bell's view, "we must acknowledge that many, perhaps a majority of
[B]lack children are in worse shape today than at any time since the end
of Reconstruction, perhaps since the end of slavery"
42
These facts demonstrate the failures of change. Why then is it that
for African Americans "nothing has changed"? 43 For Bell, the grave facts
are not the legacy of slavery or evidence of some "intrinsic weakness" in
Blacks themselves; rather, they are integral to a social system where the
subordination of Blacks serves as a source of protection for the identity
and social stability of Whites.4 The permanence of racism thesis recog-
nizes racism's "deepest roots."" Racism is not a lingering vestige of a
historical past; it is a present, ongoing system of subordination.
Bell has come to identify this continuing system and structure of ra-
cism as dependent on the effects of a property right in Whiteness.4 6 The
35. See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 5. For an earlier statistical picture, see
Bell's Faces at the Bottom, supra note 8, at 45-48.
36. See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 15.
37. See id. at 150; see also id. at 151 ("[B]lack men are suffering a genocide-like
demise from the work-force, from the family and, increasingly, from life itself.").
38. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. See BELL,AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 162.
40. See Greg Winter, Schools Resegregate, Study Finds, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at
A14 (citing a new study by Harvard's Civil Rights Project); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 123
S. Ct. 2411, 2443 n.4 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (observing that "[n]eighborhoods
and schools remain racially divided" and citing, among other evidence, the Harvard study).
41. See, e.g., BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 59.
42. Derrick Bell, Public Education for Black Children: A Future Role for Dramatic Crisis,
in QUALITY EDUCATION FOR ALL IN THE 21ST CENTURY: CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE?
25, 30 (1994) [hereinafter Bell, Public Education for Black Children].
43. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 22.
44. See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text.
45. BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 12.
46. To my knowledge, Bell first proposed the concept in And We Are Not Saved,
which dates to 1987. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note ', at 172. Cheryl Har-
ris later independently developed the concept. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. Rv. 1709, 1713 n.9 (1993) (noting her separate generation of the idea). In
his own presentation of the concept, Bell makes frequent reference to Harris. See, e.g.,
BELL, AFROLANTrICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 9, 149; DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AU-
THORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER 71 (1994) [hereinafter BELL,
CONFRONTING AUTHORITY]; Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Forty-Five Years
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property right in Whiteness asserts an entitlement of priority, preference,
and privilege over Blacks. 47 "[T]he set of assumptions, privileges, and
benefits that accompany the status of being [W]hite can become a valu-
able asset that [W]hites seek to protect."48 The advantages are economic,
political, and psychological,4" and they accrue to every White whether he
or she seeks it or not.S°Whiteness provides an underlying sense of indi-
vidual and group identity; Whites "bond" on the basis of race.' A
property in Whiteness offers a vested right in a superior status
5 2 Blacks, by
contrast, have a caste-like lower status; they are different, less worthy. 3
Whites deal with racial issues by ultimately protecting their property
right in Whiteness: they act not out of altruism or morality but in self-
interest.5 4 If White interests conflict with racial justice, White self-interest
prevails.5 5 As Bell has argued since at least 1980, racial change occurs only
as a matter of "interest convergence": "The interest of [B]lacks in achiev-
ing racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with
the interests of [W]hites."16 This is true even in such heralded decisions as
After the Fact, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 171, 176 n.13 (2000); Derrick Bell, Love's Labor Lost?
Why Racial Fairness is a Threat to Many White Americans, in LANI GUINIER & SUSAN STURM,
WHO'S QUALIFIED 42, 46-47 (2001) [hereinafter Bell, Love's Labor Lost]; Derrick Bell, Ra-
cism: A Major Source of Property and Wealth Inequality in America, 34 IND. L. REv. 1261, 1270
(2001) [hereinafter Bell, Racism]; Derrick Bell, Wanted: A White Leader Able to Free Whites of
Racism, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 536 (2000) [hereinafter Bell, Wanted: A White Leader];
Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, supra note 18, at 904-05; Derrick Bell & Linda
Singer, Making a Record, 26 CONN. L. REV. 265,270 n.21 (1993).
In earlier work such as And We Are Not Saved, Bell also uses a somewhat different
vocabulary to describe Whiteness, appropriating Manning Marable's concept of the
"'ideological hegemony' of [W]hite racism." BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note ',
at 156 (quoting Manning Marable, Beyond the Race Dilemma, THE NATION, Apr. 11, 1981, at
428,431).
47. See BELL, AFRoLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 9, 55.
48. Derrick Bell, Revised Opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, in WHAT BROWN V.
BoARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 185, 188 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter
Bell, Revised Opinion].
49. Id. at 185.
50. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 13.
51. Bell, Wanted: A White Leader, supra note 46, at 540 (citing bell hooks); see also
BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM, supra note 8, at 155 ("all [W]hites are bonded--as bell hooks
says--by racism") (emphasis added).
52. See BELL, AND WEARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 137.
53. Id. at 95.
54. See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics,
97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1611-12 (1988) [hereinafter Bell & Bansal, 771e Republican Revival] ("ra-
cial reforms in law reflect less a late-blooming civic virtue than perceived changes in self-
interest ... .
55. Bell, Love's Labor Lost, supra note 46, at 44.
56. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980); see also BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM, supra note
8, at 53 ("[B]lacks gain little protection against one or another form of racial
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Brown. 7 There, for instance, protection of the United States' image abroad
during the Cold War was vital to the arguments in favor of the Supreme
Court's ultimate holding. 8 The Brown decisions also reflect a second ele-
ment of Bell's interest-convergence thesis: not only is a court's holding
dependent on White self-interest, but so is its enforcement. Brown Irs
holding that redress of segregated education should proceed not necessar-
ily immediately but with "all deliberate speed"5' 9 is, says Bell, an
"unprecedented deferral of a recognized constitutional right."6 Further,
not only is the courts' enforcement at stake because of White self-interest;
so also does this self-interest spawn White resistance to the courts' original
holdings.6 1 Civil rights litigation has placed too much emphasis on win-
ning a case and too little on its actual impact .62 Even if a case is won, its
goals will be ignored, circumvented, or negated if they challenge existing
claims of White entitlement.63 "[T] he traditions of racial subordination are
deeper than the legal sanctions. '64 Any reforms that arise as a result of civil
rights litigation must cohere with White self-interest.6 Even though some
individual Blacks may have advanced due to the abandonment of formal
barriers, these advances may actually serve more general White interests.
These advances ironically serve to enhance rather than undermine social
discrimination unless granting [Bilacks a measure of relief will serve some interest of im-
portance to [W]hites.").
57. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
58. See BELL, ArRoLA'rricA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 116-19 (citing, among other
authorities, Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REsV. 61
(1988)).
59. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955).
60. BELL,AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 118.
61. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 108 ("If [a] self-interest ap-
proach is a valid explanation for the change in constitutional interpretation ... then why
wouldn't the same self-interest have to be present before that decision could be imple-
mented?").
62. Id. at 54. Of additional interest here in Bell's attention to implementation is his
appropriation-for his more progressive purposes-of analyses drawn from law and eco-
nomics, a field stereotypically viewed to be conservative or libertarian. The most direct
evidence of this appropriation arises in Bell's narrative, The Racial Preference Licensing Act, see
BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 47-64, where Bell creates a fictional scheme
to tax enterprises that choose to remain discriminatory. See id. at 54 n.* (citing the work
of law and economics scholars, Richard Posner and John J. Donohue).
63. See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 53 (ignored); BELL, AND WE ARE NoT
SAVED, supra note t, at 248 (circumvented); Bell, Revised Opinion, supra note 48, at 186
(negated).
64. BELL,AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note ', at 191-92.
65. See id. at 63.
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stability.? They serve as "proof" that racism is no more, is dead.67 As Bell
argues, "[P]rogress in American race relations is largely a mirage, obscuring
the fact that whites continue, consciously or unconsciously, to do all in
their power to ensure their dominion and maintain their control."
'6
Part of Bell's great frustration and deep disappointment is that his
interest-convergence thesis suggests that Whites low on the economic
ladder might have sought alliance with Blacks in similar conditions. That,
however, has not occurred.69 Rather than recognize and work together
with similarly situated Blacks to redress the commonality of their plight,
Whites at the economic bottom identify with Whites at the economic
top and blame Blacks of a class similar to their own as the source of their
problem. 70 There is no greater sign of the power of Whiteness as a prop-
erty right. Whites not at the economic top act against their best interests.7 '
Because of their racial bond, they place themselves "'in the dominant cir-
cle-an area in which most hold no real power, but only their privileged
racial identity.' "72Whiteness as a property right is an essential element of
American social stability:
66. BELL, AnRoLANric4 LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 48; see also id. at 131-32 ("Instead
of gaining access to real influence, it is more likely that we [Blacks who have gained some
stature] are legitimizing a system that relegates us to an ineffectual but decorative fringe.").
67. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 48.
68. Id. at 159.
69. Bell explores this theme in his fictional narrative, The Chronicle of the Amber
Cloud. See BELL, AND WE AI NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 162-65. In this Chronicle, the
amber cloud's descent caused wealthy White adolescents to be stricken with the personal-
ity of poverty-ridden youth (such as lethargy, withdrawal, insecurity). An expensive cure
was developed that the nation was willing to pay. But when the request came for non-
White youths also to be treated, the nation refused. As Bell relates, this Chronicle "under-
mined [his] theory that progress for [B]lacks might evolve out of a national crisis
endangering [Wihites as well as [B]lacks." Id. at 165.
70. See Bell, Racism, supra note 46, at 1270-71; see also Derrick Bell, The Triumph in
Challenge, 54 MD. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (1995) [hereinafter Bell, The Triumph in Challenge]
(claiming that the goal of racism is "to divide and alienate along racial lines those similarly
subordinated as a means of maintaining the economic and political advantages held by
well-off [W]hites").
71. BELL, AFROLANrrIc LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 8; see also BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED, supra note t, at 254 ("The stark truth is that [W]hites as well as [Bilacks are being
exploited, deceived, and betrayed by those in power."); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism in Ret-
rospect, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 199, 206 (E.
Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997) [hereinafter Bell, Racial Realism in
Retrospect] (arguing that Justice Brennan's judicial opinions maintain that "[t]he constitu-
tional rights that [B]lack people seek are also the rights a great many [W]hite people need.
His labors sought to illuminate this obvious truth in the face of its rejection by so many
[W]hites who fear that racial equality would diminish rather than enrich their lives.").
72. BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM, supra note 8, at 8 (quoting Kimberl6 Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 HtARv. L. REV. 1331, 1380-81 (1988)).
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The barriers to moving beyond reliance on an out group for
social stability are monumental in a nation where [W]hites of
widely divergent stations are able to make common cause
through their unspoken pact to keep [B]lacks on the bottom.
No other aspect of social functioning has retained its viability
and its value to general stability from the very beginning of the
American experience down to the present day. Because of this
fixation, I agree with Professor Jennifer Hochschild's assess-
ment that racism is not an anomaly, but a crucial component
of liberal democracy in this country. The two are historically,
even inherently reinforcing. In effect, the apparent anomaly is
an actual symbiosis.
73
The progress of Blacks in the courts and in society has not advanced
but been stymied. Bell's work directly challenges two liberal beliefs: first,
that society (and the courts) progress in an inherent, evolutionary direc-
tion toward equality,74 and second, that education-education about the
plight of Black Americans-leads to change.75 The evidence that Bell ad-
duces demonstrates that the belief in evolutionary racial advance is but
73. Bell, Racism, supra note 46, at 1270 (citing JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW
AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984)). As Bell
writes:
[We must address the reality that we live in a society in which racism has
been internalized and institutionalized to the point of being an essential and
inherently functioning component of that society-a culture from whose in-
ception racial discrimination has been a regulating force for maintaining
stability and growth and for maximizing other cultural values.
Bell, Racism is Here to Stay, supra note 12, at 88-89.
74. See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 47. Sociologist Karl Mann-
heim described the liberal humanitarian utopian view as "the belief that reality moves
continually towards an ever closer approximation to the rational," a belief that "sees the
world moving in the direction of a realization of its [liberal] aims." KARL MANNHEIM, IDE-
OLOGY AND UTOPIA 223,224 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shuls trans., Harvest 1936).
75. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 150. Bell describes:
our long-held belief [that] education is the key to the race problem. You
know ... education leads to enlightenment. Enlightenment opens the way to
empathy. Empathy foreshadows reform. In other words, that [W]hites-once
given a true understanding of the evils of race discrimination, once able to
feel how it harms [B]lacks-would find it easy, or easier, to give up racism.
Id. For Mannheim, the liberal humanitarian utopia focuses on the power of the idea and
its experience through education. See MANNHEIM, supra note 74, at 219, 228. The belief in
education as a tool of reform is of course one shared by many who make education their
profession.
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"naive belief' 7 6 It is a belief that the evidence contests and refutes. And
the character of Whiteness as a property interest has proven resistant to
racial education: the pull of racial self-interest, bond, and power has been
too strong. "[V]iewing racism as an amalgam of guilt, responsibility, and
power-all of which are generally known but never acknowledged-may
explain why educational programs [about race] are destined to fail."7 7
Racism is permanent. The progresses that have been achieved-the
ending of formal racial barriers, the advances of certain individual Blacks
in education and in material and social condition-were expected to sig-
nal racism's end, but they have not. Instead, they have exposed beneath
this surface "a more sophisticated and more invidious vehicle for main-
taining [W]hite dominance."7 8 Even as many of "the exposed tentacles of
the evil we fought" have been lopped off, "the true evil, the deeply felt
need of so many [W]hites to maintain priority status over [B]lacks, [has]
manifest[ed] itself in a myriad of new forms. '79 Bell discusses racism as
akin to a gyroscope. Individual advances may occur, but the gyroscope
always returns to its initial equilibrium. Our society, says Bell, is the "mo-
tivating force" of the gyroscope's movement, even as it seems "to operate
by an internal energy source."80 Bell invokes Bartok's opera, Bluebeard's
Castle,81 as a metaphor for the hazards facing American Blacks.82 In the
story, Judith marries Bluebeard and hopes to humanize him. She be-
seeches Bluebeard to let sunlight into his dark home, but he refuses.
Because of her efforts to open up his home, he ends up locking her
away.83 In Bluebeard's protection of his dominance and domain, Blue-
beard's response to Judith is similar to American society's to its Blacks:
"Nothing can enlight this castle.
' 84
76. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 134.
77. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 155; see also Bell, Wanted: A White
Leader, supra note 46, at 540 ("[Viewing racism as an amalgam of guilt, responsibility, and
power, all of which are generally known but never acknowledged, may explain why edu-
cational programs undertaken by the leader I seek are destined to fail.").
78. BELL, AFRoLArrIcA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 128; see also Derrick Bell, Law,
Litigation, and the Search for the Promised Land, 76 GEO. L.J. 229, 233 (1987) ("[Tloppling
rigid racial barriers may have been a prerequisite to recognizing that economic inequality
is the most virulent ingredient of racism.").
79. Bell, Racial Realism in Retrospect, supra note 71, at 199.
80. BELL, AFROIANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 58. Later in this work, Bell in-
vokes parallel imagery as he appraises a "racial history that changes form but never alters
its racial advantage for [W]hites." Id. at 168.
81. See BELA BARTOK, BLUEBEARD'S CASTLE (Columbia Records recording 1963, MS
6425).
82. See Derrick Bell, Bluebeards Castle: An American Fairy Tale, in BELL, AioLArTiCA
LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 155-68.
83. See id. at 155-57.
84. Id. at 159.
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II.THE POSSIBILITIES OF ACTION
As Bell is only too aware, his indictment that racism is permanent
can have a shattering impact on readers and listeners who had hoped for
racism's end. "If racism is permanent," he is asked, "then isn't struggle
hopeless?""5 How persist, how act when Bell's message appears to be one,
as he himself writes, of "futility and defeat, '"86 "bleakness, ' '8 and "despair' 88
a "revelationfl of distilled woe?"89 This is the conundrum at the heart of
Bell's work and of this Article. Bell insists that racism is permanent, and at
the same time he also insists "that something must be done, that action
must be taken,' 9 ° that the fight against racism must continue to be
waged. 91 How is action possible?
A. The Virtues of Necessity
As an initial matter, Bell's thesis of racism's permanence has the ef-
fect of an acid bath: it cleanses, it reveals the truth. An essential element of
Bell's effort is "to make people see,"" to make them "see the racial world
as it is." 93 His work describes; it describes what society has done and, given
the structure of racism, what it is likely to do.94 Bell's posture here reminds
me of what philosopher Paul Ricoeur calls "the destructive hermeneu-
85. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xi.
86. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note ', at 248.
87. Id. at 249.
88. Bell, Racism is Here to Stay, supra note 12, at 91.
89. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 114. Bell acknowledges as well that
critics have called his work "unremittingly despairing." Id. at xi.
90. Id. at 199.
91. See Bell, Racism is Here to Stay, supra note 12, at 91. The challenge is one that
Bell continually puts to himself. See, e.g., BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 4 ("My
immediate challenge [in writing this book] was to transform this evidence of our increas-
ingly dire plight into a written warning, one sufficiently clear to challenge us to action,
but not so devastating as to encourage denial or suggest surrender.").
92. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 60.
93. Id. at 62. As Bell acknowledges, this truth-telling resonates with the role of an
Old Testament prophet. See, e.g., id. at ix.
94. See id. at x ("[M]y conclusions about racism are less radical revelation than dis-
quieting disclosure of what many know about the real roots of racism and prefer not to
acknowledge."); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Bell, Racial Realism] ("I speak here not of some new prophetic revelation. Rather, these
are frequently stated, yet seldom acknowledged truths that we continue to ignore at our
peril."). Although the last statement indicates some distance of Bell from the prophetic,
perhaps the resonance recurs here in the prophet's disclosure of what humans, if attentive,
should already have known.
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tic,""5 the destructive method of analysis and interpretation. The task is
one of demystification; 6 the false idols must be broken.9 7 The core of the
method, though, is not skepticism but recognition of necessity. ' "The
positive benefit" writes Ricoeur, "of the ascesis required by a reductive and
destructive interpretation [is] confrontation with bare reality, the disci-
pline ... of necessity." 9 The acid bath of Bell's thesis of racism's
permanence lays reality bare; it strips away our illusions. To lay reality bare
is a virtue unto itself. We now know and must acknowledge with what
we are faced.'10
But this virtue of necessity is only one part of its value. Once we
sweep away the debris of the false idols, we can also assess what it may be
possible yet to affirm. "[D]estruction ... is a moment of every new foun-
dation." ' Confrontation with necessity is salutary. As Bell writes, "[W]e
risk despair as the necessary price of much-needed enlightenment. Facing
up to the real world is the essential prerequisite for a renewed vision, and
for a renewed commitment to struggle based on that vision." 102
95. PAUL RICOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR 237 (Charles E. Reagan &
David Stewart eds., 1978) [hereinafter RICOEuR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR]. More
famously, Ricoeur calls this the hermeneutics of suspicion. See PAUL RICOEUR, FREUD AND
PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION 33-35 (Denis Savage trans., 1970) [hereinafter
RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY].
96. See RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 95, at 34. In another vocabu-
lary, the move here can be called deconstructive. See, e.g., powell, supra note 1, at 535 ("It is
when Bell is deconstructing formal equality and rights rhetoric that his arguments are
most persuasive.").
97. See RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 95, at 27.
98. See RiCOEUR,THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR, supra note 95, at 237.
99. RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 95, at 35 (emphasis added).
100. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 92 ("At the least ... , under-
standing the true nature of racism would equip us to weather its myriad harms."). In a
question and answer session following a lecture, Bell analogizes the experience of racism
with that of alcoholism:
Alcoholics survive precisely because they acknowledge that their disease is
permanent, and that they must not only recognize it, they have to almost hail
it, you see, in order to get past it. I think that is what we must do with ra-
cism. Because there is the potential, once you acknowledge how bad it is, not
to accept it and to determine that you are going to do whatever you can ...
to oppose it.
Bell, Public Education for Black Children, supra note 42, at 43 (question and answer session).
101. RICOEUR, FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 95, at 33 (citing MARTIN HEIDEG-
GER, SEIN UND ZEIT (1927)); see also id. at 27 ("It may be that extreme iconoclasm belongs
to the restoration of meaning.").
102. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xi.
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B. Action as Protest
Action that has faced the discipline of necessity takes three forms in
Bell's work and life. The first is action as protest. 1 3 Action here recognizes
reality-including the reality of racism-but challenges it, protests it, de-
fies it, even as this action understands that it will likely end in defeat. "Our
lives gain purpose and worth when we recognize and confront the evils
we encounter--small as well as large-and meet them with a determina-
tion to take action even when we are all but certain that our efforts will
fail."'0 4 The point of action as protest is not necessarily to win but to act
with ethical integrity.' The action, whether it results in victory or defeat,
has its own dignity. The virtue comes in the very acts of engagement,
commitment,'10 6 and struggle.' The action provides its own satisfaction,'
its own sense of affirmation 9 and rightness."' While the confrontation
with reality may be despairing, the triumph comes in the continuation of
the act, the maintenance of the struggle, the refusal to accede."' "In effect,
then," Bell writes, "failure is inevitable, and there need be no failure. '
Further, although the act as protest may not result in policy change,
it may have other benefits in addition to those it has for the actor. As the
act calls others to account, it can expose the integrity or lack thereof of
103. The most well-known of Bell's own acts of protest was, of course, his decision in
1990 to take a leave of absence from Harvard Law School until the school hired a woman
of color to a permanent faculty position. When two years had passed, the University re-
quired him, under University rules, to come back or lose his tenured position. Because the
Law School hiring had not occurred, Bell refused. The University in turn refused to mod-
ify its position and ended Bell's Harvard career. Bell now teaches at the New York
University School of Law. See DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE OF MEAN-
iNG AND WORTH 3-5 (2002) [hereinafter BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION] (recounting this
protest).
104. See id. at 177.
105. See id. at 5 ("[M]y primary goal has been to live an ethical life.... That means I
try to choose the ethical route even when defeat rather than success may wait at the end
of the road.").
106. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 198 (citation omitted); Bell,
Racism is Here to Stay, supra note 12, at 90 (citation omitted).
107. See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 135.
108. See BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 46, at 123.
109. See BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 81.
110. See id. at 58.
111. See BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHORITY, supra note 46, at 161 (citing ALBERT CAMUS,
THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS (Justin O'Brien trans., 1955) [hereinafter CA-
MUS, THE MYTH OF SIsYPHus]). In Part IVA, infra, I return to examine at greater length the
existentialist character of Bell's work.
112. BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 164.
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others' actions; it can reveal hypocrisy."3 The act of protest challenges its
opponents-usually unsuccessfully-to confront the reality of their own
position. Likewise, Bell requires of himself and other sympathizers that
they too confront reality. More positively, protest may create a "magnetic
field" that extends its power and influence beyond its original domain. '14
Others may be inspired by the protest to take up the cause or similar
causes; ' others, more modestly, may be moved to support those who en-
gage in direct protest action.1 6 And the act may inspire others to act in
the future and find succor in the lineage of those who have gone be-
fore.
1 1 7
C. Action as Racial Realism
The second form action takes in Bell's work and life is as "racial re-
alism." ' 8 A hallmark of racial realism is the claim that the fight against
racism should pay less attention to ethics and more to economics." 9 Ra-
cial realism acknowledges the present reality of Blacks' subordinate status
and argues that only economic change will provide redress to poverty,
joblessness, and other similar ills. It further claims that the traditional civil
rights view that law, through effectuation of racial equality, would lift
Blacks out of their economic condition has failed.'2 The prototypical ex-
ample of Bell's realism is his long-standing resistance to Brown,1 21 its
enforcement, and its continued advocacy by the civil rights community.
2
From at least 1976, Bell has consistently-and, obviously, quite
113. See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 183.
114. BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHORiTY, supra note 46, at 130; id. at 120 ("[Plrotest
generates a magnetic force.").
115. See, e.g., id. at 71 (noting that his Harvard protest motivated some minority
lawyers to pursue legal academic careers).
116. See, e.g., id. at 3 (noting the continuing support he has received from various
walks of life for his Harvard protest).
117. See BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 136-37 (noting the value to his
own efforts of the example of his predecessors in the fight against racism).
118. See, e.g., Bell, Racial Realism in Retrospect, supra note 71; Bell, Racial Realism, supra
note 94; Bell, Divining a Racial Realism Theory, in BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM, supra note 8,
at 89-108.
119. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 98.
120. See Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 94, at 377-78.
121. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
122. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Neither Separate Schools nor Mixed Schools, in BELL, ANtD WE
ARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 102-22 (quoting WE.B. Du Bois's comment that
"[B]lacks need neither segregated schools nor mixed schools" but rather education, WE.B.
Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, in 2 THE SEVENTH SON: THE THOUGHT AND
WRITINGS OF WE.B. Du Bois 408 (J. Lester ed., 1971)); Bell, Revised Opinion, supra note
48, at 187 (again citing Du Bois's comment); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Inte-
gration Ideal and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976)
[hereinafter Bell, Serving Two Masters].
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controversially-insisted that the educational focus for Blacks should not
be on school integration but on quality education.
123
Bell's writings provide some quite provocative models of how eco-
nomic change could occur. Bell argues, for example, for recognition of
"entitlement to basic needs-jobs, housing, health care, education, secu-
rity in old age-as an essential property right of all."' 24 Elsewhere, in his
fictional narrative, The Racial Preference Licensing Act, 2 ' Bell proposes a plan
of "[r]acial realism" that "does not assume a nonexistent racial tolerance,
but boldly proclaims its commitment to racial justice through the work-
ing of a marketplace." '26 Relying on work in law and economics,127 Bell's
plan provides that business establishments that wish to discriminate should
be permitted to do so, but must pay a tax, and the tax would go to sup-
port Black businesses and other efforts in the Black community.2 In
another story, Racial Royalties,29 Bell proposes that companies that draw
on "African American music, dance, dress and hairstyles, language, and so
forth" would be charged a royalty fee that would be finneled into urban
redevelopment.'30
There is, of course, a certain self-admitted irony in Bell's advocacy of
these actions as racial "realism." On the one hand, they do act on the basis
of economics, not ethical pleadings, and Bell is quite emphatic that only
economic acts will actually lead to the improvement of Black social con-
ditions. The agenda within the Black and civil rights communities must,
he argues, come to reflect this change in attention. And there is some pos-
sibility of economic action becoming effective on the basis of self-help,1
3 '
including organized protests and boycotts.'32 But as Bell is also aware, his
123. See Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra note 122.
124. Derrick Bell, Remembrances of Racism Past: Getting Beyond the Civil Rights Decline,
in RACE IN AMERICA 73, 81 (Herbert Hill &James E.Jones,Jr. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Bell,
Remembrances of Racism Past].
125. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 47-64.
126. Id. at 47.
127. See id. at 54 n.*.
128. See id. at 48-49.
129. See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 141-51.
130. See id. at 147-48.
131. See, e.g., BELL, AFRoLANTrICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at xii ("Coalition building
is an enterprise with valuable potential as long as its pursuit does not obscure the basic
fact: nobody can free us but ourselves."); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Civil Rights Lawyers on the
Bench, 91 YAE L.J. 814, 814 (1982) [hereinafter Bell, Civil Rights Lawyers] (quoting Black
activist, Preston Wilcox, "Nobody can free us but ourselves").
132. See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 53; Bell, Civil Rights Law-
yers, supra note 131, at 814.
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proposals will run into resistance, both from the civil rights community'33
and from Whites.'3 ' Bell remains serious about the goals of economic
change, both on the basis of Black self-help and the possibility-even if
remote-of support from working-class Whites.' 31 More generally, Bell's
efforts at racial realism are thought experiments that attempt both to raise
the consciousness 136 of his readers and listeners and to urge the movement
beyond failed, traditional approaches and the examination of any possibili-
ties whose potential can be exploited.
37
D. Action as Writing
These last reflections move us to the third form of action in Bell's
work and life, the action undertaken by his writings' 3 themselves. If ra-
cism is permanent, is there any point to Bell's labors to bring his writings
before the public? Doesn't writing fail to maintain the discipline of neces-
sity: the recognition of racism as indeed permanent? Doesn't writing
assume the liberal conceit that Bell otherwise seems to criticize: that edu-
cation will lead to enlightenment, enlightenment will lead to empathy,
and empathy will lead to reform? 139 In part, Bell's response lies along lines
already addressed: that he must be true to himself and faithful to the truth
of his message: "We're a race of Jeremiahs, prophets calling for the nation
to repent."' 4 In part, though, Bell also acknowledges-throughout his
133. See, e.g., BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 54 (noting the civil rights
community's likely strenuous objection to the Racial Preference Licensing Act).
134. See, e.g., Bell, Remembrances of Racism Past, supra note 124, at 81 (noting resistance
to the campaign for basic entitlements "from many [W]hites who will be its principal
beneficiaries of its success").
135. Analogizing to the efforts undertaken by Jesse Jackson in his run for the presi-
dency, Bell advocates an educational campaign whereby "working-class [W]hites [may be]
willing to learn what [B]lacks have long known: that the rhetoric of freedom so freely
voiced in this country is no substitute for the economic justice that has been so long de-
nied to [W]hites as well as [B]lacks." Id. Bell on the same page expresses awareness
consistent with his understanding of Whiteness as property; see Part I infra, that many
White beneficiaries of his proposal will resist it. See Bell, Remembrances of Racism Past, supra
note 124, at 81. In the text, I go on to suggest how Bell reconciles the "reality" of his pro-
posal to the likelihood of its success.
136. See, e.g., BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 62.
137. See id. at 60.
138. For present purposes, Bell's lectures and other oral presentations should be un-
derstood to be included within the rubric of the not quite adequate term, his "writings."
139. See id. at 150.
140. Id. at 157. Other commentators have termed some of Bell's work a "jeremiad."
See, e.g., Marcus Bruce, "The Promise of American Life": Derrick Bell, Critical Race Theory, and
the American Jeremiad, in FOLKWAYS AND LAW WAYS: LAW IN AMERICAN STUDIES 165 (Helle
Porsdam ed., 2001) (discussing BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26); Delgado & Stefancic,
Derrick Bell's Chronicle, supra note 27, at 329 (claiming Bell's chronicle, The Space Traders, in
BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 158-94, "is a classic Jeremiad-a tale aimed at
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work-that his message may fail. A few lines down from the sentence just
quoted, Bell continues: "About the least dire fate for a prophet is that one
preaches, and no one listens; that one risks all to speak the truth, and no-
body cares"' 4' And even if the prophet has listeners, prophecy may lead
not to conversion but to resistance.'42 Elsewhere Bell recalls his late wife
Jewel's admonition that "trying to teach the [W]hite folks" was folly 43
Bell recognizes as well the quixotic character of fighting with words
against structures of oppression and economic and political power.'
Yet there is a deeper purpose to Bell's writings also, one that does not
reject the limitations just raised but carves out its own space nevertheless.
This deeper purpose is comprised of three elements. First, as with other
writings of a comparable perspective, Bell's stories can provide "understand-
ing and reassurance" for those, such as many Blacks, who have walked a
similar path.4 Bell's truthtelling is the telling of their stories. These "coun-
terstories" at the same time contest majoritarian stories and "strike a chord"
with the ready listener. 146 The stories can provide a sense of "homeland" in
readers' minds and hearts.'47 By contrast, for those readers, mainly White,
who have not trod Bell's path, Bell's writings-particularly the fictional nar-
ratives--serve a second function. The narrative form invites readers to
suspend judgment and belief, so that they may be more open to the reality
making a powerful group aware of its own iniquitous history and potential for more of the
same"). Later we shall return to Bruce's claim that the jeremiad, and Bell's version of it,
offers not simply condemnation but hope. See infra note 153.
141. BELL, FACES AT THEBOTTOM, supra note 8, at 157.
142. See BELL, ArRoLArTrICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 33. In another of his stories,
Bell narrates the power of a minister's sermon in music but her audience's determination
"not to be moved by it." BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 213.
143. See BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHomTv, supra note 46, at 148 (referring to Bell's
protests rather than his writings); see also BELL, Trying to Teach the White Folks, in BELL, Gos-
PEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 29-48 (fictional narrative); BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra
note 8, at 135 (narrating the incredulous response of his fictional character, Geneva
Crenshaw, to his attempt to write an allegory that would shame Whites into proper ac-
tion).
144. See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANrICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 34-35 ("[I]t sure is tough
trying to resist oppression with words and ideas."); id. at 33 ("[I]t's hard to imagine how
more of our writings [his and Geneva Crenshaw's] can halt or even hinder the hostile
forces arrayed against our people.").
145. Bell, Whos Afraid of Critical Race Theory, supra note 18, at 910 (writing of the
value of critical race writings more generally).
146. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Racial Realism: A Commentary on White Optimism
and Black Despair, 24 CONN. L. REv. 527, 530 (1992) ("It is no accident that Bell has a
tremendous underground circulation and status in the minority community of color. We
know that his message is true").
147. See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 172. The sense of "homeland"
also has a prospective quality, as I shall discuss below. See infra notes 151-57 and accompa-
nying text.
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of the views expressed,14 even as their prior reality is disrupted. 1 9 The
story may be revelatory: both as an unmasking---you claimed to hold to
the truth of equality but did not-and as the announcement of a new
truth.1s
Does the possibility of an announcement of a new "truth" conflict
with Bell's thesis that racism is permanent? It may well, and at this crux
we (and Bell) confront the deepest dimensions of the abiding paradox in
his work: that racism is permanent, but action is possible. At one level,
Bell's writings demand that we confront what is. And yet at another level
they open us to what may be.' Racism is elemental to "what is," but we
do not know what "may be." Bell does not want to discard or escape his
thesis of racism's permanence, and yet he has hopes for the future. This is
an indissoluble tension. Bell's work has a "transformatively aspirational
concern." 152 His work is disruptive both to challenge what is and to open
the way for what may be." 3 He does not know what may be, but the dis-
ruption may spark revelation." 4 He does not intend, for instance, for his
fictional proposal of a racial preference licensing law to be enacted, but
the shock generated by its perspective may cause an opening beyond tra-
ditional views.5 5 The shock may generate contemplation and exploration
of new alternatives.1 6 Bell wants to open the way for new, real, but yet
unknown possibilities.
15 7
148. See Bell, Whos Afraid of Critical Race Theory, supra note 18, at 902.
149. See id. at 899.
150. See, e.g., BELL, AFaotANrscA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 155. Elsewhere I plan to
develop this comment at much greater length. See George H. Taylor, Bell's Narratives as
Parables (forthcoming 2005).
151. See Derrick Bell, 1995 Commencement Address-Howard University School of Law,
38 How. LJ. 463, 470 [hereinafter Bell, Commencement Address] (expressing of the similar-
ity between the artist and the protester that "the main creative urge" in both operates
through "a medium that communicates a view of what is against a background of what
might be").
152. Bell, Whol Afraid of Critical Theory?, supra note 18, at 906 (discussing critical race
theory in general).
153. See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 4 (analogizing what he hopes to
produce in his efforts to those of gospel music, which has the potential "to touch and
unite across barriers of race and class"). Marcus Bruce describes Bell's Gospel Choirs as a
jeremiad that, like other jeremiads in American history, both engages in critique and calls
for "a profound spiritual transformation of American society." Bruce, supra note 140, at
167.
154. See, e.g., BELL, AnRoLA'NTicA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 167 ("[T]here is the po-
tential for self-revelation for Whites as well as Blacks."); id. (speaking of "the door of racial
revelation").
155. See BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM, supra note 8, at 60.
156. See id. at 62.
157. In the final pages of And We Are Not Saved, Bell offers a more optimistic conclu-
sion than the prior despairing narratives would suggest. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED,
supra note t, at 248-58. These pages have received significant criticism. See, e.g., Mary E.
Becker, Racism and Legal Doctrine, 67 TEX. L. Rav. 417, 428 (1988) (criticizing that Bell
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E. Action: Not By Morality Alone
Revelation of new possibilities is necessary, but more than revelation
is required if change is to be actual and effective. New truths will be re-
sisted. ' Here we return to Bell's criticism of the liberal model-the
assumed progression from education to enlightenment to empathy to re-
form."'5 The appeal to morality-that change should occur because it is
the right thing to do-is insufficient.' ° In part Bell's response here is due
to his experience with the failure of "morals-policing" laws, including
Brown. 6' Compliance is not voluntary, and it is difficult to enforce.16 2 Bell
contends that society ultimately acts on the basis of self-interest '63 and
power.'64 Racial realism acknowledges that change will not occur "until
here "turns wildly optimistic"); Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform, supra
note 27, at 927 ("The gap between the bleak picture painted in the first part of the book
and the rosy ending is puzzling."). Yet Bell's stance there can be reconciled with this larger
emphasis in his work. What is most important about the passage is not its specific reme-
dies, which the weight of prior pages would suggest are unworkable, but the call for a
"Third Way" (between Black emigration and violent struggle). The "Third Way" calls for
another route, some new future. As Bell admits, this appeal is "utopian," but the point is to
proceed beyond failed options to something else that is as yet "difficult even to envision."
BELL, AND WE AR NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 255. This form of utopia should be con-
trasted to utopia as escape. See BELL, AmRoLTaricA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 172
(contrasting his fictional Afrolantica, which is a "reflection" of the world, with Camelots
and Shangri-las, which are all "envisioned as escapes from the real world"). Paul Ricoeur
develops the contrast between utopia, in its best function, as "exploration of the possible"
and utopia as escape, "the completely unrealizable" in PAUL RCOEuR, LECTURES ON IDEOL-
OGY AND UTOPIA 310 (George H. Taylor ed., 1986) [hereinafter RJCOEUR, LECTURES ON
IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA]. Bell's vision is utopian in the sense of "exploration of the possi-
ble."
158. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 143 ("The presentation of truth
in new forms provokes resistance, confounding those committed to accepted measures for
determining the quality and validity of statements made and conclusions reached, and
making it difficult for them to respond and adjudge what is acceptable."); see also Bell &
Bansal, The Republican Revival, supra note 54, at 1620-21 ("[F]aith in the intellectual solu-
tion may be as deserving of recognition as faith that our humanity will not always be
subordinated because we are not [White.").
159. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 150.
160. In one fictional narrative, Bell has a character chastise himself for having done
what he had often criticized civil rights representatives for doing: "[H]e had tried to get
[W]hites to do right by [Bilack people because it was right that they do so .... 'Crazy!' he
mumbled to himself, at himself." Id. at 171.
161. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
162. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 51.
163. See, e.g., Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival, supra note 54, at 1613 (expressing
skepticism about "society's willingness to act out of virtue rather than self-interest").
164. BELL, AFROLAN'rIcA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 171 ("[T]here seems no end to
those who view power as license to abuse, sanction to exploit, invitation to demean. Will a
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blacks become insistent or ... political or economic conditions dictate
[such change]."'65 Reliance on faith and hope is not enough; their fulfill-
ment requires works.
166
Over seventy years ago, the following statement appeared:
It is hopeless for the Negro to expect complete emancipation
from the menial social and economic position into which the
white man has forced him, merely by trusting in the moral
sense of the [W]hite race.... However large the number of in-
dividual [W]hite men who do and who will identify
themselves completely with the Negro cause, the [W]hite race
in America will not admit the Negro to equal rights if it is not
forced to do so. Upon that point one may speak with a dog-
matism which all history justifies.'67
As is evident, the conclusion is one with which Bell agrees, and it is one that
he has quoted favorably.'68 The statement appeared in 1932 under the hand of
American Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. As we seek more com-
pletely to understand Bell's work, it is worthwhile to consider whether
Niebuhr's theology--and the paradox it maintains between the permanence
of sin and the possibility of action-can inform our comprehension of
Bell's paradox-the permanence of racism and the possibility of action.
III. NIEBUHR'S THEOLOGY
Niebuhr's major theological work was produced during the 1930s
and early 19 40s.169 It was written against the backdrop of-and responded
to-the aftermath of World War I, the Depression, their resultant social
and political unrest, and the sweep of history toward World War II. In his
important new book on Niebuhr,17° theologian Langdon Gilkey writes:
In a turbulent epoch when evil often appeared to be dominant,
Niebuhr's theology seemed to present the possibility of a social
realism that maintained its moral nerve and did not become ei-
ther cynical or despairing, even when self-interest appeared to
time ever come when those with power believe in and practice justice? ... [Bloth history
and our experiences support a pessimistic response.").
165. Id. at 167.
166. See Bell, Public Education for Black Children, supra note 42, at 37. 1 return to the
theme of the interrelation of faith and works in Part IV, infra.
167. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SociETY, supra note 3, at 252-53.
168. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 160.
169. These books include Moral Man and Immoral Society, see supra note 3, published
in 1932, and the two volumes of The Nature and Destiny of Man, see supra note 3, pub-
lished, respectively, in 1941 and 1943.
170. See GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3.
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rule everywhere. Since the optimistic base for creative work for
justice was now gone, the question was: How is it possible to
have hope and to maintain the struggle for justice in a world so
filled with self-interest?
17 1
Three elements of this appraisal deserve our attention. First, we can
easily sense a strong resonance between Niebuhr and Bell. Although each
writes in a different historical moment, a similarity of themes predomi-
nates: evil and self-interest are perdurant, but, regardless, we must
undertake the struggle for justice and the drive toward new possibilities.
Niebuhr's theme is one of "social realism" Bell's is one of "racial realism"
Second, as I now turn to discuss, Niebuhr's theology is a political theology.
Third, as I will then discuss, it is a theology that-like Bell's work-
criticizes the liberal assumption of optimism and inherent progress.
A. A Political Theology
Often the preoccupation of Christianity is viewed to be with the in-
dividual: his or her own individual sin, individual relation to God, and
individual salvation in a life hereafter.1 72 Niebuhr's focus is quite different.
His paramount concern as a Christian theologian is social existence and his-
torical meaning. '73 For Niebuhr, "[t]he obligations that faith entails are those
that mainly involve the creation of justice and love in our own historical
communities"; the primary result of sin is not distance from God "but in-
justice toward the neighbor in historical time."1 74 At the heart of his thought
is a "passion for social justice and for historical renewal"; his theology's aim
is to provide "a foundation for creative action in the world."' 1 Niebuhr's is
therefore a political theology.
176
Like Bell's fight against the prevailing liberal civil rights doctrine of
his era, Niebuhr had to fight against the prevailing liberal theological and
social doctrine of his own. Niebuhr, like Bell, contested what Niebuhr
called the "modern optimism [in] a philosophy of history expressed in the
idea of progress." '1 7 Liberal doctrine did not regard evil as a serious or
171. Id. at xi.
172. See, e.g., id. at 204 n.3 (making the contrast).
173. See id. at 20. As Gilkey relates, Niebuhr also attends the individual dimension,
but this is a less prominent consideration. Id.
174. Id. at 228.
175. Id. at 22.
176. See id. at 20.
177. 1 NIEBUIHR, NATURE AN) DESTINY Or MAN, supra note 3, at 24. Niebuhr goes on
to describe this philosophy as one relating historical process to the innate unfolding of a
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persisting problem.7 ' Niebuhr, like Bell, argued that this optimism was
seriously belied by the facts of the world around him. Liberalism's failure
to attend the seriousness of evil also left it unable to function as a source
of insight, understanding, or possible answer when the facticity and perva-
siveness of evil could no longer be denied.'79 Niebuhr's theology intended
to be more responsive, both to the existence of the problem of evil and to
the ways it could be addressed. 80 Against liberalism, Niebuhr revived the
concept of sin to understand the nature of evil. In a considerable trans-
formation of classical doctrine, he reinterpreted the symbol of sin as
relevant for social, not simply individual, life in order to make it pertinent
to his world. 8 ' Ironically, as we shall see, Niebuhr found that liberal doc-
trine had underestimated the dimensions not only of the "daemonic
misuse" we may make of human freedom but of human freedom itself.'82
B. Sin
The doctrine of sin lies at the center of Niebuhr's thought.'83 For
him, sin has two dimensions: vertical and horizontal. "' The vertical
biological process. Id. In the opening pages of Moral Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr's
criticism of liberalism is scorching:
Inasfar as this treatise has a polemic interest it is directed against the moralists,
both religious and secular, who imagine that the egoism of individuals is be-
ing progressively checked by the development of rationality or the growth of
a religiously inspired goodwill and that nothing but the continuance of this
progress is necessary to establish social harmony between all the human so-
cieties and collectives.
NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMoRAL SociETY, supra note 3, at xii; see also id. at xviii ("Most
of the social scientists are such unqualified rationalists that they seem to imagine that men of
power will immediately check their exactions and pretensions in society, as soon as they have
been apprised by the social scientists that their actions and attitudes are anti-social.").
178. See, e.g., 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 23 (assessing
that the "final certainty" of modern social theory "is its optimistic treatment of the prob-
lem of evil").
179. See GILrY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 78 ("[T]wentieth-century historical
existence had challenged the liberal confidence in human rationality and morality and the
liberal faith in historical progress, and had left as a consequence a vast spiritual vacuum.").
180. Davison Douglas observes that Niebuhr's views here had a notable impact on
the work of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: "Drawing on Niebuhr, King wrote in 1952 that
liberalism 'vainly seeks to overcome injustice through purely moral and rational sua-
sions.... Perfect justice will not come by a simple statement of the moral superiority of
brotherhood in the world, for men are controlled by power, not mind alone." Douglas,
supra note 3, at 159 (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., Reinhold Niebuhrs Ethical Dualism, in
2 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING,JR. 146 (Clayborne Carson ed., 1992)).
181. See GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 23.
182. 1 NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 24.
183. See GILKEY, ON NIEBUR, supra note 3, at 102.
184. See, e.g., 1 NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 226.
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dimension of sin consists of "man's rebellion against God, his effort to
usurp the place of God." ' Humans attempt to transmute their partial,
finite values and selves into an ultimate good.1 8 6 To this end, sin is mani-
fested in the form of pride, self-love, and self-righteousness."7 And it is
manifested by humans universally.1 The lurking, continuing, and destruc-
tive presence of sin in all of human life"s9 is the testament of its depths and
perdurance. Sin is not isolated as the property of the most wicked but is
everyone's." As is well known, the complication for Niebuhr here-as for
the history of Christian doctrine-is how to explain that sin is universal
without also concluding that it is an ineluctable component of our essen-
tial nature 9' and therefore outside the realm of individual responsibility
1 92
Niebuhr argues that sin cannot be understood apart from human
freedom. "The essence of man is his freedom. Sin is committed in that
freedom."'93 Freedom is wrongly used. 94 Sin is a defect in the will, and
the will entails freedom; the defect lies in freedom, not in a destruction by
185. Id. at 179.
186. See id. at 122.
187. See id. at 188 (pride, self-love); id. at 200 (self-righteousness).
188. See id. at 242.
189. See GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 200.
190. See id. at 108-09. In his book on Niebuhr, Gilkey illustrates this universality of
sin through the experiences he-Gilkey-underwent for two-and-a-half years during
World War II as a member of a civilian internment camp established by the Japanese in
China. (He had been rounded up shortly after the beginning of the war while a teacher of
English at a Chinese university.) Although the circumstances at the camp were trying, they
were not in the same universe as the horrors experienced in the German concentration
camps. For Gilkey, the real pathos were the sins of selfishness committed by camp residents
(not the Japanese) over such issues as room reallocation. The sins were shocking precisely
because the issues were so modest. See id. at 117-19. For a more comprehensive account,
see LANGDON GiLKEY, SHANTUNG COMPOUND (1966). When I attended Gilkey's Niebuhr
lectures, see supra note 3, the most memorable class was the day Gilkey recounted some of
his camp experiences as part of his larger discussion of sin. Despite the passage of time,
Gilkey's description movingly displayed his continuing dismay and anger at his campmates'
behavior, behavior that still brought tears to his eyes.
191. In part for this reason Niebuhr rejects any literalistic account of "original sin as
an inherited taint" from Adam and Eve. 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra
note 3, at 260. Niebuhr finds value in an originalist account only because of its "represen-
tative rather than historical" character. Id. at 261. For Niebuhr, as Gilkey deftly phrases it,
Adam and Eve are symbols, not causes, of the human condition. GILIKEY, supra note 3, at
134.
192. See 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 242.
193. Id. at 17; see also 2 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 80
("Where there is history at all there is freedom; and where there is freedom there is sin.").
194. See 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 16.
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sin of the human essence.19 Sin is universal but not necessary.116 Niebuhr
acknowledges that the relation between freedom and sin remains para-
doxical, something that "cannot be fully rationalized."1 97 Also unexplained
is why humans have a "bias toward sin,"'' 9 or why each individual suc-
cumbs. For Niebuhr, the mystery of sin's origins remains. 99
If sin's vertical dimension is the human effort to place oneself in the
center, the horizontal dimension-the "moral and social dimension"-is
injustice.20 According to Niebuhr, "[t]he ego which falsely makes itself
the centre [sic] of existence in its pride and will-to-power inevitably sub-
ordinates other life to its will and thus does injustice to other life."20 1 Here
Niebuhr's theology as political comes to the fore. Injustice is an "inevita-
ble concomitant" of pride.20 2 The will-to-power is both a form and
instrument of the pride that is "sin in its quintessential form."2 3 Niebuhr
submits that, where there is unequal power, those in power will use what-
ever means needed to maintain it and will seek to justify those means as
plausibly as they can.20 4 Self-righteousness is "responsible for our most
serious cruelties, injustices and defamations" against our fellow humans, as
the "whole history of racial, national, religious and other social struggles"
shows.20 The self-righteousness extends to group identification, including,
as Niebuhr says directly, group identification of Whites that has led to re-
jections of the claims of Blacks.
20 6
Whether or not we view as adequate Niebuhr's account of sin-
particularly the basis for its vertical dimension, its universality-two
points are worthy of consideration. First, just as Niebuhr argues that we
may understand the nature of sin only by understanding the nature of
human freedom, so he also argues we may understand the nature of hu-
man freedom-the ability to act, the human "freedom of spirit" 2 7-only
by understanding the nature of human sin.21 We recur to this interrelation
195. See id. at 242; see also id. at 269 ("[S]in is a corruption of man's true essence but
not its destruction.").
196. See id. at 242.
197. Id. at 262.
198. Id. at 250.
199. See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 234-35.
200. 1 NIEBUHR, NATuRE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 179.
201. Id; see also id. at 223 ("The pride which makes itself the source and end of exis-
tence subordinates other life to its will and despoils it of its rightful inheritance.").
202. Id.
203. See id. at 192.
204. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AD IMMoRAL SocIEry, supra note 3, at 34.
205. 1 NIEBUHR, NATuRE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 200.
206. Reinhold Niebuhr, Man, the Unregenerate Tribalist, 24 CHRISTIANITY & CIsis 133,
133 (July 6, 1964) [hereinafter, Niebuhr, Man, the Unregenerate Tribalist].
207. 1 NIEBUHR, NATuRE AN DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 96.
208. See id. at 17.
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when we turn to Niebuhr's discussion of the possibilities of action."0 Sec-
ond, even if we reject Niebuhr's theology or ontology, does the experience
of sin he describes seem accurate or telling? Whatever its ontological or
theological basis, does the experience he describes-the interrelation of
sin and freedom, the pervasiveness of pride, will-to-power, and self-
righteousness--seem true?1 ° This, to me, is the most important question
to ask in response to Niebuhr: does his work capture the lived experience?
In turn, our question is whether the lived experience he does capture
helps us understand what Bell means by the permanence of racism: some-
thing at once pervasive and yet also a matter of human responsibility.
C. Guilt
Irrespective of whether we accept the ontological or theological
dimensions of Niebuhr's portrayal of sin, Niebuhr's account seems to pre-
sent a problem on its own terms. As Niebuhr acknowledges, the claim
that sin is universal seems to imperil the possibility of social judgment and
action. How does one judge between individuals or between groups if
everyone is characterized by sin?21' Niebuhr answers by differentiating
between sin and guilt. Guilt represents the actual consequences of sin in
the historical, horizontal dimension. 12 And, Niebuhr argues, although
there may be equality of sin, there is inequality of guilt:2t 3 "[T]hose who
hold great economic and political power are more guilty of pride against
God and of injustice against the weak than those who lack power and
prestige."" '2 The acts of those in power result in a greater number of unjust
historical consequences. They are therefore more guilty.
25
209. See infa text accompanying note 219.
210. See, e.g., GsIKEY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 132-33 (describing how our
actions may at once seem conscious and so free, and yet at the same time how "experience
of ourselves (and especially of others!) shows that these actions are themselves pushed,
driven, impelled, forced to be more self-concerned, more unjust and insensitive, more
unloving, than we claim or want to think of ourselves as being").
211. See 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 220; see also
GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 112.
212. 1 NIEBUHR, NATUhiE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 220-22. As Gilkey
observes, part of the distinctiveness of Niebuhr's presentation lies in its emphasis on guilt
as the historical consequence of sin, rather than, as for the earlier tradition, transhistorical
consequence, "before God." See GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 228.
213. See 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 225; see also
GILKEY, supra note 3, at 112.
214. 1 NIEBUHR, NATuRE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 225; see also id. at
223.
215. See GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 113-14.
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White men sin against Negroes in Africa and America more
than Negroes sin against [W]hite men. Wherever the fortunes
of nature, the accidents of history or even the virtues of the
possessors of power, endow an individual or a group with
power, social prestige, intellectual eminence or moral approval
above their fellows, there an ego is allowed to expand.... Its
horizontal expansion involves it in an unjust effort to gain se-
curity and prestige at the expense of its fellows.
216
If we want to pursue justice, we can choose between historical actors and
align ourselves with those having the least guilt.
2 7
D. Possibilities ofAction
As we come to understand the functioning of power and self-
righteousness in the world, we recognize the operation of the horizontal
dimension of sin and the injustices it creates. Challenge of and resistance
to these injustices signify one real measure of the possibilities of action in
this world. Do we humans have a capacity, though, not just to protest the
unjust but to determine the just and work toward its behalf? What is our
capacity to know and do good?
In his response to these questions, Niebuhr returns to his juxtaposi-
tion of freedom and sin and his claim that liberal doctrine had
underestimated the capacity of both.2"8 He argues, "Both the majesty and
the tragedy of human life exceed the dimension within which modern
[i.e. liberal] culture seeks to comprehend human existence. ' 21 9 It is the
human spirit's "yearning for the infinite" that is "the source of both hu-
man creativity and human sin." 2 ° Humans are sinful but not solely sinful.
Freedom is the basis of sin, but sin is not the whole of freedom. 2 ' The
lessons here are several. First, the fact that sin is not the sum of human
existence keeps alive the possibility of meaningful earthly action; earthly
existence is not simply or solely evil.222 Second, this creativity is part of
our earthly freedom: the human capacity for imagination, invention, and
breakthrough, in issues ranging from the sciences to the arts to govern-
ment to social relations.
23
216. 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 226.
217. See id. at 112.
218. See 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 24.
219. Id. at 122; see also id. at 124 ("Man is not measured in a dimension sufficiently
high or deep to do full justice to either his stature or his capacity for both good and evil
... . d
220. Id. at 122.
221. Id. at 17.
222. See GirKEY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 84.
223. See, e.g., id. at 200.
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Third, this creativity and freedom coexist with sin, and the realism of
social action must confront the capacities for human sin-power, self-
righteousness-in human action. Contrary to liberalism, social reform
will not occur principally due to "the power of education and moral sua-
sion" '224 but will require employment of politics and power.225 Niebuhr
calls for the use of boycotts, for instance.2 26 He is cognizant that groups in
power will not surrender their power voluntarily.227 Recall Niebuhr's
comment on the prospect for racial reform: "[T]he [W]hite race in Amer-
ica will not admit the Negro to equal rights if it is not forced to do so.
Upon that point one may speak with a dogmatism which all history justi-
fies.' '228 Niebuhr acknowledges the inevitability in human social action of
pressure, tension, and conflict. Acknowledgment of these methods does
not and should not make them normative, but, Niebuhr adds, "neither
will we ease our conscience by seeking to escape from involvement in
them. We will know that we cannot purge ourselves of the sin and guilt in
which we are involved by the moral ambiguities of politics without also
disavowing responsibility for the creative possibilities of justice."' The
creative possibilities are ours, and we must accept responsibility for their
development. So doing, though, will also require us to act with realism, in
recognition both of the use of power by those in positions of dominance
and of the need for exertions of power in response.
The final element of the human yearning for the infinite brings out
the full extent of human freedom. Thus far, the analysis of social realism
might suggest that the pursuit of social "justice" is simply a matter of
power versus power. Yet missing is a claim of some deeper notion of the
good that can undergird the claim that action is indeed undertaken on
behalf of the "just" cause. And it is this deeper notion of the good that
Niebuhr's theology especially wants to articulate. As Gilkey comments,
integral to Niebuhr's argument is a "dialectic of realistic social analysis on
the one hand and transcendent grounds for judgment and hope on the
other."' Niebuhr wants to establish what it means to labor-in this
world, realistically, with the ambiguous tools necessary-"for higher jus-
tice" and will do so "in terms of the experience of justification by
224. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SociEry, supra note 3, at 253.
225. See, e.g., id. at xxiii. Recognition of the inextricable role of power in society, in-
stead of the sufficiency of moral suasion, is part of the critique of liberalism. See MAMNNHmavl,
supra note 74, at 225.
226. See NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SocIETY, supra note 3, at 254.
227. See id. at 253.
228. Id. For firther elaboration of Niebuhr's assessment of American racism, see infra
notes 358-68 and accompanying text.
229. 2 NIEBUHR, NATuRE AND DESTINY or MAN, supra note 3, at 284.
230. GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 23.
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faith."23' Faith in a transcendent God,232 a sense of "dependence on an ul-
timate source of being, 233 provides "a transcendent source of meaning."
234
This transcendent source grounds human creativity and freedom 23 and at
the same time acts as a source of judgment and criticism on all human
action as to the finitude of its perspective, errancy, and sin.2 36 In the face of
the storms and failures of human existence, including the lack of success
in the pursuit of social justice, this transcendent source provides an "assur-
ance of meaning,"'23' an assurance that meaning and goodness do exist
both in general and for us each. It acts as a source of renewal and hope
238
that provides sustenance for our return to the world of action.
239
E. The Persisting Paradox
Niebuhr has no doubt that the interrelation he describes between
the pervasiveness of sin and the possibilities of human action-between
"fate and freedom"-remains paradoxical. 20 And Niebuhr recognizes that
our tendency would be to reject the paradox precisely because it seems
nonrational and absurd.24' He asks us to consider, though, the limits of
human rationality and to be open to the possibility "that a rationally ir-
resolvable contradiction may point to a truth which logic cannot
contain."24 2 This response is, of course, open to at least two objections: that
he has not provided a good justification for going beyond reason and that
his rationale opens the way to the propounding of any multiplicity of ab-
surd or paradoxical beliefs. Niebuhr's defense is quite a simple one: is not
the paradox between sin and freedom that he describes more encompass-
ing of the facts of our experience than any non-paradoxical account?
Loyalty must be to "all the facts" to the "complexity in the facts of ex-
perience."2 '' Think of physicists' understanding of quantum mechanics or
of light's being both a wave and a particle. The underlying nature of either
231. 2 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY of MAN, supra note 3, at 284.
232. See, e.g., 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 136.
233. Id. at 131.
234. GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 151.
235. See, e.g., id. at 200.
236. See, e.g., id. at 17.
237. See id. at 54.
238. See id. at 18; see also id. ("a permanent principle of renewal").
239. See, e.g., id. at 11 (describing Niebuhr's claims of "a confidence in transcendence
that supported a renewed and restrengthened moral commitment").
240. See 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 262.
241. Id.
242. Id.; see also id. at 125 ("Man is thus in the position of being unable to compre-
hend himself in his full stature of freedom without a principle of comprehension which is
beyond his comprehension.").
243. Id. at 263.
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is not clear-indeed it seems illogical-yet physicists find quantum me-
chanics experimentally workable and light's character as wave and particle
experimentally verifiable.2 4 Niebuhr's theology is not experimentally
verifiable, but like nuclear physics, grants priority first to experience, not
the bounds of logic. Again: "a rationally irresolvable contradiction may
point to a truth which logic cannot contain."
245
As throughout the discussion of Niebuhr, it is not necessary here to
assert the truth of the ontology or theology that Niebuhr presents. The
concern is much less with the theological "categories or forms" that Nie-
buhr brings to bear than with the "content or materials" of this
understanding--sin and freedom-which arise from experience.246 Gilkey
asserts that the "mystery" Niebuhr discusses "is constitutive of real existence
... and thus is a part of our experience. As a consequence, these paradoxes
turn out to make more sense of the contradictions and puzzles of actual
experience (which puzzles also arise from this relation) than do the co-
herent systems that delight the mind."214 What Gilkey asserts, I ask as a
question. Whether or not we agree with Niebuhr's theology or ontology,
do we find his understanding of human experience "very close to the
history we all continue to experience each day"? 248 We can ask this ques-
tion of ourselves, and for the purposes of this Article, ask it more precisely
of Bell's work, a subject to which I now return.
244. See, e.g., BmAN L, SILVER, THE ASCENT OF SCIENCE (1998) (describing physicists'
understanding of light as wave and particle, id. at 393-95, and summarizing the experi-
mental validity of quantum mechanics, id. at 398-99). Writing of quantum mechanics,
Silver asserts:
It works every time, but it flouts common sense.... How can thousands of
scientists use a theory that has irrational features to it? Because where theo-
retical results can be compared with experimental observations, one can only
pray that all theories were as reliable. No scientist would dream of stopping
using quantum mechanics because he doesn't understand its foundations.
Id. at 398. Silver goes on to disparage contemporary efforts to analogize from quantum
mechanics to the social sciences and humanities, including religion. Id. at 399-40. My
appropriation of the example of quantum mechanics is, I hope, somewhat different. As the
text proceeds to suggest, the point is not to exclude methods of analysis simply because we
cannot capture within our logic their foundations.
245. 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 262.
246. GILKEY, ON NIEBUHR, supra note 3, at 127-28 (making the differentiation be-
tween sources, not the difference in emphasis).
247. Id. at 172.
248. Id. at xii.
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IV BELL, THEOLOGY, AND BEYOND
What are the possible resonances between Niebuhr and Bell's por-
trayals of human existence? Does Niebuhr's discussion of the paradox
between sin and action help us to understand better Bell's paradox be-
tween action and racism's permanence?
A. Bell's Existentialism
An initial question is whether Bell's work is properly situated within
a religious framework. Does the vocabulary of existentialism perhaps bet-
ter capture Bell's argument?29 Bell does refer several times to the work of
the French existentialist, Albert Camus, and cites Camus for two basic
points. First, Camus warns that we must proceed "'with weapons in our
hands and a lump in our throats.'"20 On the one hand, we must go for-
ward; any attempt not to act and to remain "pure" will lead to the hurt of
others. On the other hand, we must act, even though action may well
cause injury to those we had hoped to assist.2"' As we shall return to later,
Bell emphasizes the necessity but also the humility of action. 52 Second,
and the point to which I want to draw much greater attention here, Bell
also refers positively to Camus' contemporary appropriation of the myth
of Sisyphus. In that myth, of course, the gods condemned Sisyphus to
spend every day rolling a rock up a hill, only to have the rock fall to the
bottom, requiring Sisyphus to begin his labors endlessly yet again.23 For
Bell and Camus, what is particularly notable in Sisyphus is his conscious
adoption of his destiny. As he turns to go back down the hill and resume
his effort, "'he is superior to his fate. He is stronger than his rock.""'2 4 To
similar effect, Bell elsewhere cites Camus as someone who maintained the
necessity of struggle even though defeat was certain. 215 In Camus' words,
249. I later respond to the potential objection that religion and existentialism may be
overlapping categories. See infra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
250. BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHORIY, supra note 46, at 113 (quoting ALBERT CAMUS,
THE .EBEL: AN ESSAY ON MAN IN REVOLT 8 (Anthony Bower trans., Vintage 1978) (1951)
[hereinafter CAmus, THE REBEL].
251. BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHORnY, supra note 46, at 113-14 (citing CAMus, THE
REBEL, supra note 250, at 286-87).
252. See infra text accompanying note 328.
253. See CAMus,THE MYnTH OF SISYPHUs, supra note 111, at 88-91.
254. BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 46, at 161 (quoting CAVIus, THE
MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 111, at 89). A similar quotation appears in Bell, Commence-
ment Address, supra note 151, at 470. To my knowledge, Bell refers to Camus' Myth of
Sisyphus in only one other passage, where his fictional character, Geneva Crenshaw, criti-
cizes the story narrator that "there is a Sisyphean element that is missing from your
current formulation." BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 140.
255. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xiv. In this passage Bell goes on to
quote from Albert Camus, ALBERT CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 26 (Justin
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"[t]he struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart."' 2 6
The struggle may end in defeat-the rock will again roll down the hill-
but the triumph comes in the struggle itself 2 7 Meaning derives from en-
gagement and commitment, not the end result.2s This is reminiscent of
Bell's emphasis on action as protest,"5 what Camus calls "revolt' '260 or "re-
bellion."
' 261
Perhaps the most resonant linkage between Camus and Bell surfaces
in Camus' The Plague,262 a work that Bell, to my knowledge, does not cite.
In that book, a fictional town is overwhelmed with the plague and, to
contain the spread of the epidemic, the town is quarantined; no one may
enter or leave.2 63 (The book, first published in 1947, is at one level an alle-
gory of the Nazi occupation during the years of World War 11.264) The
inhabitants experience exile, deprivation, and great suffering, including
innumerable deaths. 26 The primary certitudes of the novel's protagonists
are, first, that they must face their plight and not shut their eyes to it.
266
Second, they must fight the plague and save as many as possible from dy-
ing and from prolonged separation from those outside the town.267 Third,
they must fight although victory is never lasting; the plague means "[a]
O'Brien trans., 1960) [hereinafter CAMus, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH]. An identi-
cal reference to Camus appears in Bell, The Racism is Permanent Thesis, supra note 12, at
584. On both these pages in Bell's work, he also cites to a similar end Franz Fanon's para-
doxical argument that racist structures are permanent and yet resistance should be
maintained, citing FRANZ FANON, WHITE SKIN, BLACKS MASKS (1967). I am aware of only
two other places in Bell's corpus where he cites Fanon, both on separate propositions than
the argument here. See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 141 (noting Fanon's
advocacy of a "spiritual rebirth" through commitment to social revolution); BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 207 (noting Fanon's acknowledgment of "the political
implication in the [Bilack man's attraction for [W]hite women").
256. CAMus, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 111, at 91.
257. See BELL, AFRoLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 135.
258. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 198.
259. See supra Part II.B.
260. See, e.g., CAMus, THE MYTH OF SISvPHUS, supra note 111, at 40 ("revolt gives life
its value").
261. See, e.g., CAMus, THE REBEL, supra note 250, at 22 ("In our daily trials rebellion
plays the same role as does the 'cogito' in the realm of thought: it is the first piece of evi-
dence.... I rebel-therefore we exist.").
262. ALBERT CAMus, THE PLAGUE (Stuart Gilbert trans., Modern Library 1948) [here-
inafter CAMus, THE PLAGUE].
263. Id. at 59.
264. See e.g., PHILLIP THODY, ALBERT CAMus: A STUDY OF HIS WORK 34 (1957) (so
stating).
265. See CAMus, THE PLAGUE, supra note 262, at 65 (exile), 151 (exile and depriva-
tion), 272 (exile and suffering).
266. Id. at 156.
267. Id. at 122.
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never ending defeat. '2 68 The plague never dies but at best simply becomes
dormant and may arise again.26 9 Fourth, and most soberingly as Camus
extends the allegory, the plague is not just a force external to us but one
"that each of us has ... within him; no one, no one on earth is free from
it."27 Even those who seek to heal can nevertheless cause injury.27 1 The
tale to be told, Camus writes:
could not be one of a final victory. It could be only the record
of what had had to be done, and what assuredly would have to
be done again in the never ending fight against terror and its
relentless onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, by all
who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to
pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers.2"
The meaning of the plague is "[j]ust life, no more than that." '273 As in
Bell's work, the affliction is societally pervasive and seemingly inextrica-
ble.274 Battle must be waged against the pestilence, and the struggle will
never be finally victorious. 7 As Bell's own appropriation of Camus marks
directly, Bell's thesis has a patently Sisyphean, existentialist quality.
And yet Bell's and Camus' existentialism also diverge. Camus en-
gages in rebellion not only against human social conditions; his rebellion
is ultimately "metaphysical": a protest against the human condition in an
anonymous universe.7 The universe is anomic: meaning-less and heart-
less, not intentionally cruel but rather indifferent. The universe is "divested
of illusions and lights," and humanity finds itself there "an alien, a
stranger. ' 27 The condition of humanity, caught between the need for
meaning and the "silence of the world," is "absurd. '" 78 Because the uni-
verse has no meaning, the only proper understanding of it is one of
nihilism. And yet Camus wants to declare nevertheless that "it is possible
to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism."279 The act of rebellion
268. Id. at 118.
269. Id. at 278.
270. Id. at 229.
271. Id. at 227. This and the prior quotation come from the mouth of Tarrou, a
priest.
272. Id. at 278.The quotation comes from the book's final page.
273. Id. at 277.
274. 1 set aside until later the question of whether Bell would ascribe either to him-
self or other Blacks the sin of racism. See infra notes 310-37 and accompanying text.
275. See CAMUS,ThE RPEBEL, supra note 250, at 278.
276. Id. at 23.
277. CAmus, THE MYrnT or SIsYPHUS, supra note 111, at 5; f ALBERT CAMUs, THE
STRANGER (Stuart Gilbert trans., 1946).
278. CAMUS,THE MvTH OF SISYPHUs, supra note 111, at 21.
279. Id. at v; see also CAmus, THE PEBEL, supra note 250, at 302 (section entitled "Be-
yond Nihilism").
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understands the terms of the universe but does not accept them; rebellion
is an act of defiance. 280 Battle must be waged against the indifference of
the universe and against the human sufferings within it, even if the task is
one only of reducing the number of evils committed and sufferings un-
dergone, not changing the universe's ultimate meaninglessness. 281
"[S]truggle implies a total absence of hope (which has nothing to do with
despair), a continual rejection (which must not be confused with renun-
ciation), and a conscious dissatisfaction (which must not be compared to
immature unrest)." '282 Human action causes no rents in the weave of the
universe's anomic fabric but can still have its own integrity and merit.
When Bell, by contrast, finds value in action as protest, his vocabu-
lary is not simply existentialist, but religious. Even as he reiterates that
protest will likely lead to defeat, he talks of it as "a kind of spiritual salva-
tion '28 3 that "can bring an inner triumph of the spirit.'" 284 In it "there is
the salvation of spirit, of mind, of soul. '285 In part, Bell's conviction is that
if we cannot control the fate of others, acting with integrity is an effort to
take care of our own "soul."286 Yet there is something more. Unlike Ca-
mus' existentialism, which expresses defiance in the face of what is viewed
to be the ultimate meaninglessness of the world, Bell expresses a belief
that even if his protest defies the realities of the social world, it comports
with the truths of a more far-reaching world. 287 Bell remains existentialist,
280. See CAMus, THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 111, at 41.
281. See CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 255, at 73.
282. CAmus, THE MYTH or SISYPHUS, supra note 111, at 23; see also id. at 26 ("the
absurd is the contrary of hope"), 67 ("Being deprived of hope is not despairing."). When
Bell says that Camus sees in the myth of Sisyphus courage and liberation "rather than
hopelessness," BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 46, at 161, this must be under-
stood to be a power at the level of human action-its integrity, its limited effectiveness-
not at the level of some more ultimate meaning.
283. Bell, Wanted:A White Leader, supra note 46, at 541.
284. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xii.
285. BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 177.
286. See id. at 63 ("All we have to do in life is save our souls.") (citing Alice Walker);
id. at 154 (citing Tracy Chapman, All That You Have is Your Soul, on CROSSROADS (Elektra
1989)). In another passage, Bell recounts a conversation with his fictional character, Ge-
neva Crenshaw, where Crenshaw reminds Bell of a Biblical message, although not exactly
so told in the Gospels. The disciple Peter expressed to Jesus his despair that the people
would ever understand Jesus's message. "At this point, Jesus put his hand on Peter's shoul-
der and said: 'Peter. Save thyself. The rest are mine.'" BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra
note 15, at 170-71.
287. See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 4 (claiming that his protest
actions have "enriched my life and provided me with the perhaps unrealistic but no less
satisfying sense that I was doing God's work").
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but as I now turn to explore, his existentialism has a more strongly reli-
gious component.288
288. Bell's religious existentialism joins a well-known variant of existentialism, whose
major figures include the nineteenth century Danish theologian, Soren Kierkegaard, see,
e.g., SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE SICKNESS UNTo DEATH (Walter
Lowrie trans., 1954) and the twentieth century American theologian, Paul Tillich, see, e.g.,
PAUL TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE (1952). Niebuhr's theology can also be described as
existentialist. See GILKEY, supra note 3, at 74. A biographer discusses Niebuhr's "Sisyphean
perspective." See RICHARD WIGHTMAN Fox, REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A BIOGRAPHY 217 (1985).
Although it would take us too far from our main topic to describe in any great de-
tail Camus' views on Christianity that keep his own existentialism relentlessly one of
religious critique, a summary of his criticisms is relevant both for honing the character of
his own existentialist posture and for illustrating how Bell's religion differs from the relig-
ion that Camus challenges. Camus develops at least four overlapping criticisms of
Christianity:
1. He rejects the religious stance that looks for salvation in another, nontem-
poral world, rather than seeking to act in this one. See, e.g., CAMUS, THE
MYTH OF SISYPHUS, supra note 111, at 113 ("[lf there is a sin against life,
it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life as in hoping for an-
other life and in eluding the implacable grandeur of this life."); CAMUs,
THE REBEL, supra note 250, at 306 (arguing as "the only original rule of
life today: to learn to live and to die, and, in order to be a man, to refuse
to be a god. At this meridian of thought, the rebel thus rejects divinity in
order to share in the struggles and destiny of all men."); CAMUS, RESIS-
TANCE, REBELLION AND DEATH, supra note 255, at 73 ("If Christianity is
pessimistic as to man, it is optimistic as to human destiny. Well, I can say
that, pessimistic as to human destiny, I am optimistic as to man.").
2. He rejects the religious avowal that any positive mark on humanity
comes from God's grace rather than from human action, which Christi-
anity describes as inherently sinful. See, e.g., CAMUS, RESISTANCE,
REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 255, at 72 ("I was not the one who
said that man was incapable of saving himself by his own means and that
in the depths of his degradation his only hope was in the grace of
God."); CAMUS, THE PLAGUE, supra note 262, at 116 (arguing that no
one believes in an all-powerful God as "proved by the fact that no one
ever threw himself on Providence completely").
3. He rejects the Christian notion of sin. See, e.g., CAMUS, THE MYTH OF
SISYPHUS, supra note 111, at 30 (observing that for Kierkegaard "sin is
what alienates from God. The absurd, which is the metaphysical side of
the conscious man, does not lead to God. Perhaps this notion will be-
come clearer if I risk this shocking statement: the absurd is sin without
God."); id. at 113 ("There are words I have never really understood, such
as 'sin.'"); CAMus, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 255,
at 73 ("I feel rather as Augustine did before becoming a Christian when
he said: 'I tried to find the source of evil and I got nowhere.' ").
4. Perhaps most profoundly, Camus rejects a God who permits evil and al-
lows deep human suffering to occur. See, e.g., CAMUS, THE REBEL, supra
note 250, at 24 ("The metaphysical rebel is ... not definitely [i.e., not
necessarily] an atheist, as one might think him, but he is inevitably a
blasphemer. Quite simply, he blasphemes primarily in the name of or-
der, denouncing God as the father of death and as the supreme
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B. Bell's Religiosity
It has long been apparent in Bell's writings that religion has been a
signal part of his life and work,"8 9 and this has become increasingly overt
in books such as Gospel Choirs20 and Ethical Ambition. 291 Bell has
outrage."); id. at 303 ("Even by his greatest effort man can only propose
to diminish arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice
and the suffering of the world will remain and, no matter how limited
they are, they will not cease to be an outrage."); C.sus, RESISTANCE,
REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra note 255, at 71 ("I continue to struggle
against this universe in which children suffer and die."); CAMUS, THE
PLAGUE, supra note 262, at 196-97 ("until my dying day I shall refuse to
love a scheme of things in which children are put to torture"). For
someone such as Camus writing in the aftermath of the Holocaust and
World War II, the immediacies of evil and the sufferings and deaths
they caused were certainly a most stark source of reflection, as those
events should continue to be for us all.
In sum, Camus writes that humans must choose between one of two possible
worlds: either "the sacred" or "the world of rebellion"; he adds, "[t]he disappearance of one
is equivalent to the appearance of the other." CAmus, THE REBEL, supra note 250, at 21.
This choice between one of two alternatives is one that Bell and Niebuhr reject. I leave
their more detailed rejoinders to Camus largely to the main body of the text, and the
comparison offered there is indirect. Let me offer three more direct responses here. First,
recall that Niebuhr's is a political theology: he wants to consider how human action is
meaningful for ends in this world, not for some life beyond. See supra text accompanying
notes 173-76. Second, Bell cites Tillich positively for the proposition that the situation of
faith is now (or should be) one where there is no longer "belief in an all-knowing deity"
and yet a "'courage of confidence"' can be invoked "under which genuine belief can be
sustained despite circumstances tending to destroy it." BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note
103, at 42 (citing TILLICH supra). Third, as we have seeh, for both Bell and Niebuhr evil is
not something that simply happens to humans or something of which they are simply
hosts (as they would be of a plague). They emphasize the volitional character of human
evil; evil is a human act, something for which humans bear responsibility. In Niebuhr's
terms, sin is a function of human freedom. See supra text accompanying note 193. It
should bear noting that my brief presentation of Camus' views on Christianity and the
potential responses to them by Bell and Niebuhr does not attempt to adjudicate between
these figures.
For more extended engagement with Camus about his response to Christianity, see
ALBERT CAMus, The Unbeliever and Christians, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH, supra
note 255, at 67.The quotations above from this book come from the pages of this essay.
289. See, e.g., BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM, supra note 8, at 145 ("I and other minority
teachers are encouraged, even inspired in our scholarly pioneering by the Old Testament's
reminder that neither the challenge we face nor its difficulty are new."); see also Bruce,
supra note 140, at 174 ("There has always been an otherworldly or spiritual dimension to
[Bell's] writing.").
290. See supra note 26.
291. See supra note 103.
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documented his religious upbringing in the Protestant Black church2 92
and his continuing religious faith. 93 He describes himself as Christian, but
his faith is not cabined by traditional Christian doctrine. 94 Bell finds
Christian literalism to "trivialize the depths of [the Bible's] meaning and
the universality of its message."29 The depth of biblical meaning fortifies
rather than waters down or destroys belief. For Bell, "God is there, even if
not in the form I had long imagined."29 6 This faith that takes on the chal-
lenges of contemporary criticism is one that Bell also locates in
Niebuhr.297 Bell's religiosity is finally something not so much a matter of
doctrine but something located in the heart: a deep-seated faith, a core
affect, a guiding belief.2 9 Bell's drawing upon the music and message of
the spirituals and gospel hymns,29 9 what he has often called a "theology in
song:' is particularly revealing of his faith.3 ° This music provides a "spiri-
tual nourishment ... a universality that is capable of touching all who
hear and needs its comfort, its consolation. ' 30 1 The message in the music is
one of the sustenance that faith provides: "We've come this far by faith." '3 2
"I don't believe He brought me this far, to leave me."3 3 " 'Twas grace that
292. See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 77; BELL, CONFRONTING
AutrrHOT, supra note 46, at 15.
293. See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 75-93 (chapter entitled
Evolving Faith); id. at 88 (describing some of his continued religious practices).
294. See id. at 79.
295. Id. at 85.
296. Id. at 88.
297. Id. at 85.
298. See, e.g., id. at 77 ("Just as there are those who are religious but have little faith,
there are those who claim no religion and yet have concepts of living that define real
faith"). Bell's faith provides him an "emotional fuel." Id.
299. See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 78 (noting this reliance).
Bell's recourse to the spirituals and gospel hymns is most overt in Gospel Choirs, a book
that could be described as an ode to this music. Quotation of the music permeates the
text. See BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 1, 4, 17, 27, 28, 29, 49, 60, 73, 74, 91, 103,
115,141,145,152,164,171,174,188,203,206,209,210,212,213.
300. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 252; BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION,
supra note 103, at 79; Bell, Black History and America's Future, supra note 27, at 1191; Der-
rick Bell, "Here Come de Judge": The Role of Faith in Progressive Decision-Making, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 16 (1999) [hereinafter Bell, "Here Come deJudge'l; Bell, Who's Afraid of
Critical Race Theory?, supra note 18, at 909.
301. BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 3 (writing specifically of gospel music);
see also BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 79 ("The message in the spirituals is
universal.").
302. BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 203 (quoting Albert A. Goodson, We've
Come This Far by Faith, in SONGS OF ZION 192 (1981)); id. at 213-14 (same).
303. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 88 (same); BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS,
supra note 26, at 60 (quoting James Cleveland, I Don't Feel No Ways Tired, on REV. JAMES
CLEvELAD: A TRIBUTE TO THE KING (Malaco Records, MAL 2009 CD), disc 1); id. at 73
(same); Bell, Racial Libel as American Ritual, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 17 (1996) (same).
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brought me safe thus far;/ And grace will lead me home."3 0 4 "There are
some things I may not know,/There are some places I can't go,/But I am
sure of this one thing/That God is real." '3 ° A life of faith requires of each
individual: "Keep your hand on the plow. Hold on."3 6 Bell's spirituality3 7
seems a key to understanding how for him human action remains vital
and viable despite racism's permanence.
3 8
304. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 127-28 (same); BELL, GOSPEL
CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 28 (quoting John Newton, Amazing Grace, in SONGS OF ZION,
211 (1981); f IICHARiD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT
AMERICA AND RACE 57 (1995) (noting the narrator's comment that Rodrigo should entitle
the last section of a paper "Amazing Grace").
305. BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 188 (quoting Kenneth Morris, "Yes, God
is Real," in SONGS OF ZION 201 (1981).
306. BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 92 (traditional spiritual); Bell, Black
History and America's Future, supra note 27, at 1191 (same); Bell, "Here Come dejudge," supra
note 300, at 16 (same).
307. Two points deserve attention here. First is the priority granted to spirituality
instead of to religious denominationalism or doctrine. The focus is on the experience of
an individual's relationship to the transcendent and the sustenance that this relationship of
faith and grace brings. Conceptual categorization of this relationship in theological terms
remains secondary. Second, as I shall briefly return to, see infra note 393, this move toward
spirituality seems one of the significant innovations of critical race theory as a progressive
social theory.
308. This point is also emphasized by Marcus Bruce: "[T]o define Bell's work as pri-
marily a 'racial critique' is to miss his call for a profound spiritual transformation of
American society." Bruce, supra note 140, at 167. Bruce additionally quotes an interview
where Bell says that Gospel Choirs "addresses the 'spiritual nature of life' and offers gospel
music to committed activists as a 'source of strength' and a means to develop a 'faith in
something beyond our present situation." Id. at 173 (quoting Derrick Bell, The Booklist
Interview, BOOKLIST, Feb. 15, 1995, at 952). The dual function in Bell of critique as well as
exhortation is integral to what Bruce types Bell's "American Jeremiad." Id. at 167.
Although I can but note the point here, it would be interesting to develop internal
to critical race theory how different religious backgrounds might act as a relevant variable
in understanding different critical stances. For example, recall Bell's fable of the Space Trad-
ers, see BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 158. As discussed previously, see supra
notes 17-27 and accompanying text, the narrative avows that Whites would trade the
nation's Blacks to space traders for promised wealth. By contrast, Richard Delgado and
Jean Stefancic have written an alternative fable to this chronicle, see Delgado & Stefancic,
Derrick Bell's Chronicle, supra note 27, and in that alternative, the outcome is not the dire
one that Bell predicts. The account includes the following statement from a religious de-
nomination opposed to the trade:
All men and women are sons and daughters of one God. We condemn this
trade. As Jesus said, "As you did it to one of the least of my brethren, you did
it to me." This trade would sully a great nation. On judgment day, the Lord
will not look kindly on those who voted for it.
Id. at 325 (quoting Matthew 25:40). My question is whether the religious tradition(s) of
Delgado and Stefancic differ from Bell's and whether that difference is a factor in the di-
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C. Bell and Niebuhr
In assessing the possible analogies between the analyses of Bell and
Niebuhr, our initial question was whether it was proper to place Bell's
work within a religious framework at all. Having now a better sense of
Bell's religiosity, we can turn more directly and precisely to the potential
relevance of Niebuhr for understanding Bell. To what degree does Nie-
buhr's discussion of the paradox between sin and action help us to
understand better Bell's paradox between action and racism's perma-
nence?
Bell's response to Niebuhr's claim of the universality of sin (sin's ver-
tical dimension) is complex. In part, as we have just discussed, Bell's
religion is more spiritual than doctrinal, so development of theological
categories such as sin may not be of particular interest. In part too, Bell's
attention is quite evidently directed elsewhere, to what Niebuhr called
sin's horizontal dimension, the appearance of evil and injustice in the
world. We return to this point later.3 19 More generally, Bell's writings ex-
plicitly employ the term "sin" only rarely,3'° although he fairly frequently
uses the term "evil," particularly to characterize slavery and racism.
31
1
Bell's invocation of racism as an "evil" may not seem surprising, but it re-
inforces his point that racism is not something superficial, occasional, or a
matter of perception but rather something deep and perduring. Bell
verging orientation of the stories. See also R. Randall Rainey, S.J., After We're Healed: Imag-
ining a Social Order Based Upon a Justice That Reconciles, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 471 (1990)
(criticizing, from a Roman Catholic perspective, Bell's despairing vision).
309. See infra text accompanying notes 338-41.
310. The most prominent mention of the term comes in the passage quoted in this
article's title: racism as "the nation's crucial sin." BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note
t, at 125. Recall that there the reference was to a belief of Ben Goldrich, a protagonist in
one of Bell's fictional chronicles. Elsewhere in Bell's texts, the reference to "sin" is even
more anecdotal. See, e.g., id. at 78 ("1 did not want the Senator to get out of paying for all
his sins by drowning himself.") (statement by Geneva Crenshaw in a fictional narrative); id.
at 139 (the "sin of showing up the rest of society") (statement in the narrative about Ben
Goldrich); Bell, The Triumph in Challenge, supra note 70, at 1695 ("the sin of Sodom and
Gomorrah").
311. See, e.g., BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 112 (describing how his
law school text on race and racism treated racial discrimination "as the evil it is rather than
a subject ... examined 'neutrally'"); BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note ', at 34
("evil" of slavery), 37 (same), 41 (same), 42 ("evil of racial discrimination"), 44 ("evil of
racism"), 77 ("racial evils"); Bell, Black History and America's Future, supra note 27, at 1190
("evils of racism"); Derrick Bell,Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.'s Legacy, 53 RUTGERS L.
REv. 627, 632 (2001) [hereinafter Bell,Judge Higginbotham's Legacy] ("continuing evils of
racism"); Bell, Revised Opinion, supra note 48, at 185 ("the evil of racism"); Bell, The Racism
is Permanent Thesis, supra note 12, at 586 (racism as an "evil[] we cannot end"); id. at 587
("evil of racism"); Bell, The Triumph in Challenge, supra note 70, at 1693 (the "real evil, ra-
cism"); Bell, Wanted:A Mhite Leader, supra note 46, at 543 (racism as an "evilfi we cannot
end"); Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival, supra note 54, at 1612 ("the evils of slavery
and segregation").
SPRING 2004]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
excoriates the Brown312 Court, for example, because the reprehensible edu-
cational segregation that the Court there held unconstitutional "is a
manifestation of the evil of racism the depths and pervasiveness of which
this Court fails even to acknowledge, much less address and attempt to
correct." '313
At the few points where Bell's work more directly discusses the
question of the universality of sin, it is typically critical. Commenting on
another legal scholar's statement that imperfection and evil are a heritage
shared by all of humanity, Bell remarks: "I have often heard similar expla-
nations, and they have never eased either the pain or bitterness of racist
policies condoned in a nation that boasts endlessly of its equality and jus-
tice." 314 Similarly, he finds woefully insufficient "confessions of guilt" by
those who have engaged in racial oppression; these confessions do noth-
ing to solve the real economic problems Blacks are facing.31 I For Bell, the
claim of sin's universality becomes a vehicle for acquiescence, accommo-
dation, and inaction, and this message must not be accepted. Similarly,
Niebuhr differentiates sin from guilt.
316
Elsewhere Bell seems not simply to criticize but in two senses to re-
ject the universality of sin as applied to racism. First, not every White
engages in racism at least as an intentional action. Although all Whites do
benefit from racism, Bell writes, "I know that not all [W]hites are evil or
guilty in any normative sense.'" 31 7 Second, when Bell rejects Black respon-
sibility for racism, sin seems not universal but an attribute of power:
"[T]he fact that, as victims, we suffer racism's harm but, as a people, can-
not share the responsibility for that harm, may be the crucial component
in a definition of what it is to be [B]lack in America."31 1 Yet even though
these statements appear to take away from Niebuhr's account of sin as
universal, they align with Niebuhr in portraying sin and racism as deep
structures, something more implacable than specific individual actions.
They may also suggest an element of universality in the sense of the
tainted effects of power no matter by whom it is held. This theme comes
312. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
313. Bell, Revised Opinion, supra note 48, at 185 (emphasis added).
314. Derrick Bell, Preaching to the Choir: American as It Might Be, 37 UCLA L. REV.
1025, 1032 (1990) (reviewing KarmEmT L. KARsT, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989)).
315. BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 47.
316. See supra Part III.C.
317. Bell, Wanted: A White Leader, supra note 46, at 540; see also BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xvi ("not all [W]hites are racist").
318. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8 at 155; see also BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED, supra note ', at 257 ("[W]e find courage in the knowledge that we are not the
oppressors... "); Bell, Wanted: A White Leader, supra note 46, at 541 (same). In other state-
ments, Bell suggests that Blacks bear responsibility to the extent of refusing to adopt a
stance of subordinancy. See BELL, AFRoLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at xi.
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across most clearly in Bell's fable The Citadel,3"9 where we learn only at
the end of the story that the. oppressive power wielded by the rulers was
held by those with "dark skins and thick hair" and used against others, the
"lowlanders," who were "fair-skinned, straight-haired people:' Further,
generations earlier, the situation had been reversed.32 °
Additional suggestive meditations in Bell's work about the universal-
ity of sin appear in his reflections on his own activism. As Bell emphasizes
repeatedly, he has been constantly aware that his own actions may not
only end in defeat or in unanticipated consequences, but in harmful re-
sults: "Each action intended to help some will unintentionally harm or
disadvantage others who, as a result of our well-intended efforts, will
feel-and may well be-less well off."32 ' One of the most vivid and
poignant examples of this dilemma arose as a result of Bell's protest against
Harvard Law School's failure to hire to its permanent teaching ranks a
woman of color. As Bell recounts, Regina Austin, a Black law professor,
was then visiting at Harvard, and Bell's actions were interpreted as in part
advocacy on behalf of Austin. Bell had not consulted in advance with
Austin about his protest, which a number of minority women law faculty
resented, and Bell acknowledges the view that the publicity and backlash
surrounding his protest may in fact have eliminated Austin's ability to gain
a permanent position at Harvard and added significantly to the pressures
Austin had to face that year.322 Bell also grants that despite his good inten-
tions, "[i]t is not difficult to find my failure to consider the effect of my
protest on Regina Austin both selfish and sexist."323 He as well recognizes
that in the eyes of some, his actions may have delayed the hiring of
women of color for more years to come.324 Bell defends his actions but
319. BELL, AFRO ,rTIcA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 61-80. In his earlier book, Con-
fronting Authority, see supra note 46, Bell presented The Citadel in small sections that
introduced each chapter. See id. at 1-3, 9-10, 27-28, 49-50, 67-68, 81-82, 93-94, 101-02,
125-26,145-47, 165.
320. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 80; BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHOR-
IT, supra note 46, at 165 (same). In the latter work, the excerpt concludes the book.
321. BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHOmry, supra note 46, at 7; see also BELL, AFROLANTICA
LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 62 ("Our most unselfish work may turn out to do harm as
great as the injustices we tried to end."); BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHORITY, supra note 46, at
xii, 185 (same); BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM, supra note 8, at 198-99 ("our actions ... may
indeed, despite out best efforts, be of more help to the system we despise than to the vic-
tims of that system whom we are trying to help"); Bell, Public Education for Black Children,
supra note 42, at 47-48 ("What we have to do, [B]lack and [W]hite who are concerned, is
to recognize our potential in this society for doing harm even as we seek to do good.")
(question and answer session).
322. See BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHORITY, supra note 46, at 114-19 (relating these
events).
323. Id. at 116.
324. Id. at 118. Lani Guinier, who became the first Black woman hired to the per-
manent Harvard Law School faculty, reports that she did reject an invitation to teach at
the law school as a visiting professor in 1992, two years after Bell's protest began. The
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knows that they also caused pain and may have led to some unwanted
consequences.1
2
1
Elsewhere in his work, Bell frequently recurs to a statement made to
him by Reverend Peter Gomes on Bell's move in 1980 from Harvard to
become a dean at the University of Oregon School of Law. Gomes told
Bell that as a dean he would be an evil; he would find himself rewarding
those he should disappoint and disappointing those he should reward. The
task was to become a "necessary evil.."326 As in his comments about his
protests, the insight in these statements may in part be existentialist: action
is necessary but if undertaken may lead to the evil of injuring others we
had wanted to assist.327 In part the message may also be an insistence on
humility.32 The insight may be as well that in order to act for social jus-
tice, tools such as power must necessarily be employed.3 29 It is unclear
whether Bell would say that, as a social actor, he must necessarily employ
means that are sinful (sin in the horizontal dimension), and it is addition-
ally unclear whether he would also acknowledge that this employment
school was still embroiled in the issue and, she relates, "I was loath to walk into the middle
of it." She finally accepted an offer to teach as a visiting professor during 1996, was soon
after invited to join the faculty on a permanent basis, and joined the faculty in 1998. See
Nancy Waring, Lani Guinier: Present and Visible, available at http://www.law.harvard.
edu/alunmi/bulletin/backissues/spring99/article3.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2004).
325. See BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHORITy, supra note 46, at 114-19. In these pages,
Bell's comments on his protest may sometimes appear defensive. During the early 199 0s,
when I heard Bell introduce a lecture with some comments on what had happened to
Austin, it was apparent that his uppermost response was one of great sorrow about her
pain.
326. BELL, AFROLANricA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 139-40; BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION,
supra note 103, at 159-60; Bell,Judge Higginbotham's Legacy, supra note 311, at 633; Bell,
Public Education for Black Children, supra note 42, at 47-48 (question and answer session);
Andrea McArdle, An Interview with Derrick Bell, in ZERO TOLERANCE 243, 250 (Andrea
McArdle & Tany Erzen eds., 2001) [hereinafter McArdle, Interview].
327. See BELL, CONmRONTING AurHoRITY, supra note 46, at 113. In this paragraph,
which precedes his discussion of the repercussions of his protest on Regina Austin, Bell
quotes Camus' statement that we must proceed "with weapons in our hands and a lump in
our throats." Id. (citation omitted); see supra text accompanying note 250.
328. See, e.g., BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 155-64 (chapter entitled
Humility's Wisdom);BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 198.
329. See, e.g., McArdle, Interview, supra note 326, at 250 (quoting Bell that the message
he tries to convey to students is that "[a]s lawyers working in the system they are evil, but
with real care and even more real humility, they can from time to time be a necessary
evil."). In a number of other contexts, Bell has surveyed the potential abuse of power en-
abled by the attorney role. Civil rights attorneys, for example, may have had one goal-
integration-while their clients had another-equal education. See Bell, Serving Two Mas-
ters, supra note 122. For a more recent comment on this problem, see Bell, Ethical Ambition,
supra note 103, at 161. Bell has also commented on how advocacy by civil rights attorneys,
including himself, has led more to advancement of their professional careers than to im-
provement in the lives of their clients. See, e.g., BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 54.
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demonstrates sinfulness in the vertical dimension as well. Somewhat sug-
gestive of the latter are statements such as: "Power in the hands of the
reformer is no less potentially corrupting than in the hands of the oppres-
sor." 
330
One of the areas internal to the Black community where Bell has
consistently shown attention to possible "sinfulness" concerns the rela-
tionship between Black men and Black women. 33 Bell relates of his own
education on this subject: "For a long time, I thought race and sex were
separate agendas, but I have slowly come around to agreeing with my
women students-[W]hite as well as [B]lack-who have been telling me
for years that we [B]lacks must deal with sexism and patriarchy in our
communities before we can address effectively the continuing evils of ra-
cism.'' 3 2 Bell both acknowledges that there is Black male chauvinism a3
and insists that the problem cannot be reduced to or condoned as a reper-
cussion of the effects of racism on Black men. "[O]ne can't define right by
circumstances. Abuse is abuse.' ' 3 4 His critique of Black male actions is very
330. BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 159 (stated in the context of discuss-
ing Gomes's remark); see also BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 46, at 7 ("While
striving to do the Lord's work, we will look to many of our adversaries and some of our
friends like the Devil incarnate."). In this quotation, it is unclear whether the point here is
one only of appearance or of actuality. More generally, Bell is not sanguine about the
abuse of power that might occur in any future Black-run society. "A [B]lack Camelot is
not necessarily what you'd get.... Look at Haiti and any number of African countries."
BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 30.
331. This subject has received continuing attention in Bell's work. See, e.g., BELL, The
Entitlement, in GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 188-202 (discussing sexual entitlement
therapy); BELL, The Race-Charged Relationship of Black Men and Black Women, in AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 198-214; Bell, The Sexual Diversion: The Black Man/Black
Woman Debate in Context, in SPEAK My NAME: BLACK MEN ON MASCULINITY AND THE
AMERICAN DREAM 144-54 (Don Belton ed., 1995); BELL, Women to the Rescue, in GOSPEL
CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 152-63; c. BELL, Shadow Song, in GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26,
at 91-102 (discussing heterosexism).
332. BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 154-55. In some of the conversations
with his fictional character Geneva Crenshaw, Bell acknowledges his need for enlighten-
ment on the topic, as in the following response to the narrator by Crenshaw: "[S]ome
things seem never to change. White folks want to run everything. And you want to act
stupid about women." BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 176. For similar
statements by Crenshaw, see, for example, id. at 69 ("I resent your generalizations about
[B]lack women."); id. at 114 ("Thought you would taunt me into forgetting my question,
did you? Black woman, emotional--my foot!"). Bell's own attitude toward Black women also
arose, of course, in his protest over Harvard Law School's failure to hire to the faculty any
women of color. See supra notes 322-25 and accompanying text.
333. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 204 ("Black men ... can be
male chauvinists in some of the worst ways imaginable, as a whole cadre of Black women
writers have been reporting to the world for years.") (citation omitted).
334. BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 161. To the charge that many Black men
are "abusive and macho" because under the current economic system they cannot find
jobs, Geneva Crenshaw replies: "Such abuse deserves excoriation, not defense!" Id. at 14;
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direct and unremitting. And Bell has little doubt about the difficulty of
creating significant change in this context. 331 Yet at the same time, Bell
does not treat the problem as "universal" in the sense of ineluctable, a
matter of human nature. According to Bell, through education and change
of will and attitude, Black male chauvinism can be reduced.3 6 The issue
again seems one more of guilt-sin in the horizontal dimension of the
social arena-than of sin in the vertical, universal dimension.337
Whatever the final assessment of Bell's attitude toward the universal-
ity of sin, there is little question that in his thesis of racism's permanence,
he is quite in accord with Niebuhr about the manifestation of sin and
guilt on the horizontal plane. As we have seen, Bell asserts the need to
accept "the dilemmas of committed confrontation with evils we cannot
end." '338 He is persistent in his claim that those in power believe that their
"redemption may be gained without surrendering or even acknowledging
spoils obtained through the most pernicious evil. '339 As for the possibilities
of his own action, Bell, like Niebuhr, maintains that his faith requires of
him work in this world. A person's faith must be a "living, working
faith. '"3 40 One of the most oft-cited Biblical passages in Bell's work is the
following from the book of James: "So faith by itself, if it has no works, is
dead."3 ' Moreover, as already noted, Bell also accepts, as part of being a
"necessary evil," the need to act for social justice by employment of realist
tools such as power.
One additional question remains about any possible affinity between
Bell's and Niebuhr's practices in the world of action. Would Bell resist a
see also id. at 198 ("Blaming racism does no good-though racism has undoubtedly con-
tributed to stresses that lead to negative behavior.").
335. See, e.g., id. at 161 ("Seems gettin' [W]hite folks to give up their racist ways may
be a piece of cake compared to what you're taking on [i.e., the relationship between Black
men and Black women].").
336. See id. at 156 ("It's not a question of nature.... It's one of mind, of will. I mean,
my own sense of what a man is and what he should expect of women has evolved over
time.").
337. For Bell the need to stem the corrosive effects of Black male chauvinism relates
not only to the merits of the change on their own terms. Black women must also be freed
from this oppression because "[B]lack people must come to realize that our greatest
strength-our survival hope, if you will-is [B]lack women." Id. at 154-55; see also BELL,
AFRoIANTicA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 46 (reiterating his "belief that [B]lack women will
ultimately save our people").
338. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 198.
339. BELL, AFROLANTIcA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 166.
340. BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHOmRTY, supra note 46, at 162.
341. BELL, ETHIcA. AMBITION, supra note 103, at 13 (quotingJames 2:14); see also
BELL, AnsOLANTIcA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 58-59; BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra
note t, at 44; BELL, CONFRONTING AuTHomRi, supra note 46, at 108; BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS,
supra note 26, at 101.
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relationship with Niebuhr on account of the ways in which the latter's
political theology could be applied, including by Niebuhr himself?. As we
have seen, due to Niebuhr's account of the universality of sin, Niebuhr
exempts no social entity or individual from criticism."2 On the other
hand, on the horizontal plane of social action Niebuhr differentiates be-
tween levels of guilt and argues a lesser evil should fight against a
greater.343 Because of this complex stance, Niebuhr is appealed to as an
authority by figures across the political spectrum: from progressives criti-
cizing the existing order to conservatives defending policies as the lesser
of present evils. 344 On the horizontal plane of his own time, Niebuhr was
a cold warrior, strongly anti-communist.3 4 Niebuhr objected strenuously
to communism's "utopianism," which allowed its leaders to employ any
means in the short-term for the prospect of reaching the ideal goal.
Communist utopianism failed "to acknowledge the perennial moral con-
tradictions on every level of historical advance." 46 The question raised
back to Niebuhr is whether his realist ethic would ratify, under the guise
of being the lesser evil, policies such as the use of atomic bombs, the war
in Vietnam, or more contemporary American foreign policies.31 7 In part
the question is what policies did Niebuhr himself endorse,3 4 and in part
what did and does his realist ethic permit, regardless of Niebuhr's own
beliefs. 349 On one side of the debate are those who argue that Christian
realism provided "'the religious rationale for the military foreign policy
342. See supra text accompanying notes 185-90.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 211-17.
344. See, e.g., CORNEL WEST, PROPHETIC FRAGMENTS 144 (1988) (noting the range of
political views claiming Niebuhr's legacy); Thomas C. Berg, Church-State Relations and the
Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1567, 1567 (1995) (same).
345. See, e.g., RONALD H. STONE, PROFESSOR REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A MENTOR TO THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 238 (1992) ("The role of Niebuhr in leading American liberals to
oppose communism is well known."); WEST, supra note 344, at 144 ("[T]here should be
little doubt that the Christian realism of Niebuhr led him to adopt an exemplary Cold
War liberal perspective in the post-WorldWar I period.").
346. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS 37-38
(1953).
347. See COLM McKEOGH, THE POLITICAL REALISM OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A PRAG-
MATIc APPROACH TO JUST WAR 150 (1997) (raising the question).
348. Niebuhr's stance on the use of atomic bombs is complex, but he does not offer a
blanket condemnation of their employment. See id.; see also Campbell Craig, The New
Meaning of Modern War in the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, 53J. HIST. IDEAS 687,691 (1992).
Niebuhr did object to the war in Vietnam. See McKEOGH, supra note 347, at 172 n.21
(discussing in detail the development of Niebuhr's position); STONE, supra note 345, at 238.
349. The objection raised was that Niebuhr's ethic would allow acts such as the
atomic bombings at the end of World War 1I or the Vietnam War "to be possibly justified
(if the evil faced was judged great enough, if the values threatened outweighed those sacri-
ficed, if no alternatives were available)." McKEOGH, supra note 347, at 150 (describing the
objection taken).
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that created the contemporary American empire.'"'30 and that it remained
"complacent about democratic processes in advanced industrial society."35'
On the other side are those who maintain it stayed "as critical of the
cynicism and amorality and conservatism of post-war Realists as it was of
the illusions and moralism of pre-war liberals, pacifists and idealists.
'"3 12
We cannot resolve that debate here, but some relevant consequences
devolve from the very fact of the debate's continuance. The debate illus-
trates the different choices that can be drawn from Niebuhr's political
theology and ethic, and that insight is elemental to Niebuhr's realism.
Niebuhr recognizes that religion has been rightly subject to the charge of
having a "fanatic zeal," and he wants to adopt the critique to fanaticism in
any form. Fanaticism itself is the "more universal human corruption."3 3
Niebuhr warns that humans "are infected by a universal inclination to
make more of themselves than they thought" and therefore should be
"distrustful of their own virtue" and "skeptical about their apprehension
of the truth."354 In an insight challenging for all historical periods, includ-
ing our own, Niebuhr admonishes: "The self-deception of the righteous,
whether godly or godlesss, is the chief engine of evil in the world.""3 Just
as for Bell, the task Niebuhr sets is one that urges action in the world
rather than removal from it, that understands that its action may require
the use of power to fight other power, but also appreciates that its actions
must be undertaken as a "necessary evil,"' 3s6 with humility, self-awareness,
and self-criticism. The continuing challenge, of course, is that these stances
350. STONE, supra note 345, at 238 (quoting theologian John M. Swomley, Jr.); see also
WEST, supra note 344, at 149 (arguing that "Christian realists ... were much concerned
with the limits of U.S. power, [y]et they could easily justify quick and often brutal U.S.
military intervention in order to insure the appropriate balance of power").
351. RICHARD WGHTMAN Fox, REINHOLD NIEBUR:A BIOGRAPHY 220 (1985).
352. McKEOGH, supra note 347, at 145. McKeogh states: "[T]o place Niebuhr within
the conservative realist orthodoxy would be unwarranted." Id.; accord STONE, supra note
345, at 241-42. Stone states:
A sympathetic reading of Reinhold Niebuhr's writing finds him urging a
cautious policy of statecraft, the upbuilding of the developing world, a nu-
clear partnership, a decrease in American reliance on military power, outright
rejection of U.S. policy in Vietnam, and a struggle to criticize and replace the
political leadership responsible for it.
Id.
353. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, PIOUS AND SECULAR AMERICA 143-44 (1958).
354. Id. at 144.
355. Id.
356. See supra text accompanying note 326.
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are easier to voice than to implement rigorously in practice, as internal
criticism and external objection and debate may reveal.
3
1
7
The most salient place to examine Niebuhr's application of his
method lies in his approach to American racism, and let me conclude this
inquiry into Niebuhr's practice by amplifying his position here. As previ-
ously noted, Bell positively cites Niebuhr's insight that Whites will not
grant Blacks equal rights as a matter of morality but only if forced to do
so.3s It is notable that this statement appeared in Niebuhr's early work
Moral Man and Immoral Society, which dates to 1932,119 long before the
civil rights movement gained national prominence. Black civil rights re-
mained an issue of significant attention also in Niebuhr's later work. He
argued there that the disparity in rights and economic success between
Whites and Blacks was not simply a vestige of past wrongs but a differ-
ence reinforced in our contemporary period.36 1 White Americans have
had "a complacent self-satisfaction" about American democracy,361 believ-
ing that our country would solve problems of racial justice over time simply
as a matter of our "moral idealism. 3 62 But the effort to provide Blacks equal
citizenship "was bound to prove more difficult than even the most realistic
idealists imagined" for humans remain "unregenerate tribalist[s] *363 Because
of the stubbornness of these "tribal prejudices," the struggle for racial justice
would be long and arduous. 364 Niebuhr's formulation here, of course, recalls
357. Cornel West's assessment of Niebuhr is suggestive of at least one type of progres-
sive response, one that differentiates the merits of a realist method from its specific
implementation in Niebuhr's hands: "Since I believe that the religious insights of Christian
realism-its sense of the tragic, rejection of perfectionism. and sober historicist orienta-
tion--are valuable and indispensable, I locate the blindness of Niebuhr and other Christian
realists in two matters: Europeanist bias and skewed social analysis." WEST, supra note 344,
at 152.
358. See supra text accompanying note 167.
359. See supra note 3. Prior to joining the professoriate in the late 1920s, Niebuhr
had been for thirteen years a minister in Detroit, see STONE, supra note 345, at 23, and
while there had been "a pioneer on racial issues." John C. Bennett, Niebuhrs Ethic: The
Later Years, 42 CHmSTI NIrY & CmsIS 91, 95 (April 12, 1982).
360. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Negro Minority and Its Fate in a Self-Righteous Nation,
35/59 SocIAL ACTION/SOCIAL PROGRESS 53, 58 (September/October 1968) (combined
issue of two different periodicals) [hereinafter Niebuhr, The Negro Minority]. Niebuhr does
not exempt the churches from this indictment: "[T]he churches, as Negro Christians long
ago ruefully admitted, have been the most segregated communities in the South, and for
that matter, in the nation." NIEBUHR, PIOUS AND SECULAR AMERICA, supra note 353, at 82.
361. Niebuhr, The Negro Minority, supra note 360, at 55.
362. Id. at 60-61.
363. Niebuhr, Man, the Unregenerate Tribalist, supra note 206, at 133.
364. Id. at 134. Ronald Stone, a Niebuhr biographer, claims that "Niebuhr's realism
led him to expect 'slow erosion of racial prejudice.'" STONE, supra note 345, at 236 (quot-
ing NIEBUHR, PIOUS AND SECULAR AMERICA, supra note 353, at 82). This expectation of
erosion, even if slow, would seem contrary to Bell's stance that racism is permanent. It is
true that Niebuhr maintained that some prejudices, for example about Black "cultural
backwardness," would be "cured" by the forms of equal opportunity he saw the courts
SPR]Nr, 2004]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
Bell's characterization of Whiteness as a property right.36 Niebuhr en-
dorsed the civil rights activities of Martin Luther King,Jr.,3 6  and he urged
that it was grossly mistaken for the country to prioritize military expense
in the "futile war" in Vietnam particularly while at the same time the
needs of the black community were not being met.36 Niebuhr wrote,
"After almost two centuries of broken promises and pledges our debt to
our Negro minority is immense and obvious, and its burden lies heavy
upon our conscience."36 s
Having discussed possible points of comparison between Bell and
Niebuhr on the horizontal plane of social action, one last source of po-
tential resemblance remains, and that lies on the vertical plane of their
respective faiths. If Niebuhr finds in his faith a transcendent ground of
meaning,369 so does Bell. Bell frequently quotes the following passage
from Patricia Williams:
"[B]lacks always believed in rights in some larger, mythological
sense-as a pantheon of possibility. It is in this sense that
[B]lacks believed in rights so much and so hard that we gave
them life where there was none before; held onto them, put
the hope of them into our wombs, mothered them, not the
notion of them; we nurtured rights and gave rights life.... This
was the story of Phoenix; the parthenogenesis of unfertilized
hope."
370
mandating at the time. See id. at 81. But the larger phrase from which Stone quotes begins:
"If we must rely chiefly on the slow erosion of racial prejudice ...." Id. at 82. The point is
that change, if it occurs, will be slow, not immediate. There seems no necessary expectation
of continued erosion, a hesitation that Niebuhr's comments elsewhere about the human
propensity to act as an "unregenerate tribalist" may reinforce. Admittedly, it is complicated
to draw inferences from passages written several decades ago in a very different historical
period.
365. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
366. See STONE, supra note 345, at 235 ("Niebuhr referred to King as the outstanding
Protestant leader of his day, [W]hite or [B]lack. In Niebuhr's estimation, King combined
idealism and realism appropriately; in Niebuhr, King found concepts that made sense of
the heartrending struggle of the civil rights movement.").
367. Niebuhr, The Negro Minority, supra note 360, at 64.
368. Id.
369. See notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
370. BELL, FACES AT THE BorroM, supra note 8, at 25 (quoting Patricia Williams, Al-
chemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, in A LESS THAN PERFECT
UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 64 (Jules Lobel
ed., 1988)); see also BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 176; BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS,
supra note 26, at 185-86; Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, supra note 18, at 900;
Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival, supra note 54, at 1619. In a subsequent book which
draws on her essay, Williams's wording is somewhat changed. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE
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At first glance, the statement of "an unfertilized hope" appears exis-
tential, not religious.371 As Bell writes of Williams' statement, "[O]ur belief
in our rights gives them life and thus keeps alive our humanity whether
or not those rights ever materialize."372 As we have often seen of Bell, the
emphasis is on the "committed struggle." 37 3 The context seems existential-
ist because there is victory regardless whether there is outward success and
no matter whether the world-and the meaning of the world-is indif-
ferent. Struggle can bring "an inner triumph of the spirit even as,
outwardly, one suffers defeat after defeat." 374 Bell argues that Blacks possess
"the power of ourselves. It is the power of right. It is the power that
comes when we recognize that our salvation-not in Heaven, but right
here on Earth-comes from a sense of pride in our self-worth." 375 Racism
is permanent, but in action and the unfertilized hope, meaning is there.
Yet for Bell this struggle is ultimately grounded in some deeper
sense of meaning. It is Bell's faith that has provided him sustained nour-
ishment and hope in the face of the frustrations of working for social
reform. He writes:
I have relied on my faith. Particularly in hard times, my Chris-
tian faith provides reassurance that is unseen but no less real. It
never fails to give me the fortitude I need when opposing in-
justice despite the almost certain failure of my action to
persuade those in authority to alter their plans or policies. For
me it is my most powerful resource.
37 6
Bell gleans from the spirituals that enslaved ancestors retained a faith,
a faith that was their only "property."377 The faith was that "evil and suffer-
ing were not the extent of their destiny-or of the destiny of those who
would follow them."37' This seems Bell's faith also. He relies, he says, on
what Protestant theologian Paul Tillich has described as "a faith beyond
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 163-64 (1991) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS].
371. As it may indeed be for Williams. Williams writes, "For [Bilacks, the prospect of
attaining full rights under law has been a fiercely motivational, almost religious, source of
hope ever since arrival on these shores." WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS,
supra note 370, at 154 (emphasis added).
372. BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 26, at 185-86.
373. Id. at 186.
374. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at xii.
375. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at 24.
376. BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 76.
377. Derrick Bell, Victims as Heroes: A Minority Perspective on Constitutional Law, in THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES 163, 177 (A.E. Dick
Howard ed., 1992).
378. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 8, at 195.
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the unbelievable."37 9 Despite the permanence of racism and life's defeats,
action and life have meaning, a transcendent meaning. "I am convinced,"
Bell writes, "that there is something real out there in America for [B]lack
people."380 This faith is a power that he knows has been essential for many
in the Black community's struggle for racial justice, and one that he con-
tinues to urge as available and necessary to sustain future work.38 ' In the
tension between Bell's thesis of racism's permanence and his call for con-
tinued action, understanding Bell's faith provides a final key to
comprehending why this tension is a paradox and not a contradiction. His
faith holds out a hope that both hews to Bell's realism 38 2 and requires hu-
mility383 in acting upon it.384
CONCLUSION
Although Bell seems to maintain some distance from Niebuhr's un-
derstanding of sin's vertical dimension, its universality, he and Niebuhr
appear much more to share a sense of the operation of sin in the horizon-
tal dimension, in the earthly world of action where social justice is sought.
379. BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION, supra note 103, at 77 (referencing TILLICH, THE COUR-
AGE TO BE, supra note 288, at 172).
380. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 94, at 378; Bell, Racism is Here to Stay, supra note
12, at 92 (same).
381. See, e.g., BELL, AFROANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 15, at xiii ("The righteous must
rely on their faith and champion justice even in a seemingly lost cause."); BELL, AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED, supra note t, at 196 ("[Y]ou ... are looking for a third approach militant
enough to meet the reality of our condition and yet humane enough to equate with the
religious faith that helped sustain us through so many bad times."); BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS,
supra note 26, at 11 ("We need a foundation for new tactics that speaks directly to today's
crisis, one that also encompasses the vehicles of faith and steadfastness that have served us
so well in past struggles.").
382. See Bell, Public Education for Black Children, supra note 42, at 37 ("[N]either hope
nor faith can make the impossible real.").
383. See supra text accompanying note 328. Recall the importance of this humility in
Niebuhr also: "[W]e cannot purge ourselves of the sin and guilt in which we are involved
by the moral ambiguities of politics . 2 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra
note 3, at 284.
384. Bell's approach can then be described as utopian. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED, supra note t, at 255 (advocating a "utopian" "Third Way"); C. WILLIAMS, THE AL-
CHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS, supra note 370, at 154 (discussing the "moral utopianism
with which [BIlacks regard rights"). But it is utopian in the careful sense described earlier
as the "exploration of the possible," not as escape or "the completely unrealizable." See
supra note 157 (quoting RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA, supra note 157, at
310). When this approach retains its humility, it also avoids Niebuhr's criticism of utopian
ideologies such as communism, which he argued "fail[ed] to acknowledge the perennial
moral contradictions on every level of historical advance." NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM
AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 346, at 37-38.
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And they share as well a confidence in the transcendence of meaning. For
each, "[b]oth the majesty and tragedy of human life" 381 far exceed the lib-
eral portrayal of human existence. And for each, the interrelation of sin
and action or of racism and action remains paradoxical. Each seems to
suggest, though, "that a rationally irresolvable contradiction may point to
a truth which logic cannot contain." 386 As throughout, the issue for us is
less one of ontology than of experience. Niebuhr's portrayal of the experi-
enced interrelation of sin and freedom seems to illuminate the experienced
interrelation of racism and action. Diminution of the tension in either of
these interrelations will fail to capture the veracity of their tensions and of
the paradoxical experiences they describe.
The lessons Niebuhr and Bell provide are both substantive and
methodological. Substantively, they contend that human existence is
comprised of seemingly deep structures. Their assertion of these deep
structures challenges certain contemporary norms, particularly those that
maintain that human values are plastic, simply social constructions that are
nonfoundational, caught within the boundaries of particular cultures. 387
The deep structures asserted in Bell and Niebuhr---structures of both
good and evil-break these boundaries and contest nonfoundationalism.
Human existence is not simply a "blank slate ,"' 388 with which we are free
to do as we choose. One of the great contributions of Bell and the larger
project of critical race theory of which he is a member is their criticism
of nonfoundationalism in law.389 Against the claim of some in critical legal
studies that "rights" are but social constructions that society can decide to
grant or to take away,39 critical race theory argues that "rights" characterize
something more fundamental-a "truth," a "'really-out-there' objecto" '391
"a 'real' reality out there" 392-that provides an anchor, something that can
385. 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 122.
386. Id. at 262.
387. See, e.g., RicHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATuRE (1979).
Mannheim reminds us that the presence of these deep structures also challenge liberal
ideals: "[T]he deepest driving forces of the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment lay in the
fact that it appealed to the free will and kept alive the feeling of being indeterminate and
unconditioned." MANNHEIM, supra note 74, at 229.
388. See STEVEN PINKER, BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HuMAN NATURE
(2002) (arguing that there are biological constraints imposed on human behavior). My
allusion to Pinker does not necessarily presuppose any agreement with the biological con-
straints he proposes.
389. As previously intimated, see supra note 308 (discussing Richard Delgado's and
Jean Stefancic's alternative to Bell's fable of the Space Traders), further elaboration of the
varying strands within critical race theory would reveal differences as to whether racism is
"permanent" or instead a deep structure within American society as we now know it but
not necessarily permanent.
390. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REv. 23 (1993).
391. Angela P Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741,
751 (1994).
392. Id. at 753.
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be held onto, during the storm.393 Methodologically, Bell and Niebuhr
argue that it is only through critique-through confrontation, rather than
avoidance, of the deep structures of human existence-that any real possi-
bility of redemption is rendered available.3 9' This conjunction of critique
and a redemptive vision is also a dominant thread of critical race theory as
a whole.39 Niebuhr and Bell alert us that there may be more to "[b]oth
the majesty and tragedy of human life" '396 than we have recently supposed.
393. More particularly, while many conservatives have obviously long maintained
"spirituality" as an ethos, Bell and some trends within critical race theory have helped to
revive "spirituality" as a progressive possibility. For other emphases on spirituality within
critical race theory, see, for example, ANTHoNY E. CooK, THE LEAST OF THESE: RACE, LAW,
AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN CuLuRE (1997). Compare DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONI-
CLES, supra note 304, at 151 (quoting Rodrigo's observation that some of the narrator
professor's recent writings "have had almost a-how shall I put it--spiritual quality").
394. I have previously quoted similar sentiments expressed by the hermeneutic phi-
losopher Paul Ricoeur. See supra text accompanying notes 95, 101. This conjunction of
critique and restoration of meaning is a hallmark of his work. For example, in the work
quoted, Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur confronts whether meaning can survive the chal-
lenge to consciousness placed on it by the reductive hermeneutic of Freud.
395. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 391, at 743 ("Despite the difficulty of separating legal
reasoning and institutions from their racist roots, [critical race theory's] ultimate vision is
redemptive, not deconstructive."). Bell quotes and discusses favorably this passage. See Bell,
Who 's Afraid of Critical Theory, supra note 18, at 899.
396. 1 NIEBUHR, NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra note 3, at 122.
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